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THE SCOPE OF LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: MAKING 
"THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME" 
Richard S. Miller· 
My object all sublime 
I shall achieve in time-
To let the punishment fit the crime-
The punishment fit the crime. 
GILBERT AND SULLIVAN, THE MIKADO 
The difficulties that inhere in establishing the scope of liability] for harm-
producing acts or omissions shiver the foundation of the House of Law. "Ad 
hocism" abounds.2 Neither logic nor experience3 furnishes much guidance for 
the resolution of scope of liability issues that grow out of new bases of liability4 
or new understandings of the causes and effects ofharm.5 Concepts that purport 
to resolve these issues are often so elastic as to be meaningless.6 Of necessity the 
• Professor of Law, University of Hawaii; B.S., 1951, LL.B., 1956, Boston University; LL.M., 
Yale University, 1959. The author acknowledges with appreciation the helpful suggestions of 
Professors Harrop Freeman, Jeremy Harrison, and Milton Seligson, who read an early draft of this 
article. 
I By "scope ofliability" I refer to the question of which persons who suffer adverse consequences 
as a result of another's actionable acts or omissions will be permitted to recover and for what. I 
prefer this phrase to "scope of duty," "proximate cause," or "legal cause" because it is sufficiently 
descriptive for my immediate purposes but does not include the implications for how the difficulties 
should be resolved that infect the latter terms. 
2 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff fisherman permitted 
to recover prospective economic losses suffered as a result of defendant's alleged negligence in 
polluting the Santa Barbara Channel), and compare Petition of Kinsman Transit Co. (Kinsman 
No. I), 308 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) with Petition of Kinsman Transit Co. (Kinsman No.2), 388 
F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). (Plaintiffs in both cases sought damages for losses suffered in a bizarre 
series of events that followed when "some defendants negligently allowed a ship to float downstream 
and defendant City of Buffalo negligently failed to raise a drawbridge, causing collisions and the 
jamming of the Buffalo River. In deciding that plaintiffs in Kinsman No. I could recover but that 
plaintiffs in Kinsman No.2 could not, Judges Friendly and Kaufman, respectively, both ultimately 
took refuge in Judge Andrews' statement in Palsgral "It is all a question of expediency, ... it is all 
a question of fair judgment, always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to make a rule in 
each case that will be practical and in keeping with the general understanding of mankind." 
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 354-55, 162 N.E. 99, 104 (1928) (Andrews, J., 
dissenting). 
3 The reference is, of course, to Holmes' famous statement: 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, 
the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, 
even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do 
than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. O. W. HOLMES, 
THE COMMON LAW I (1881). 
4 See Maleson, Negligence is Dead but Its Doctrines Rule Usfrom the Grave: A Proposal to Limit 
Defendants' Responsibility in Strict Products Liability Actions without Resort to Proximate Cause, 51 
TEMP. L.Q. I (1978). 
• See Comment, Negligently Inflicted MenlalDistress: The Case for an Independenl Tort, 59 GEO. 
L.J. 1237 (1971). 
6 See Chun v. Park, 51 Haw. 462, 466, 462 P.2d 905, 908 (1969), and cases there cited. See 
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torts process grinds out decisions, but they are based, usually, on ill-articulated 
conceptions of "practical politics" or "expediency" and do not necessarily 
comport with either equal justice or sound policy. Little wonder that the 
problem has become a favorite of law professors7 and the bete noire of law 
students. 
Nowhere has the problem of scope of liability been more clearly exposed 
than in the courts' treatment of negligently inflicted mental distress.s On the 
one hand, general principles of negligence law and the policy of compensating 
victims deemed to be "deserving" under those principles pull in the direction 
of expanded liability. On the other hand, visions of shockingly burdensome 
liability and lingering fears of feigned claims lead to the imposition of arbitary 
liability-limiting rules. An approach that would satisfy all of these conflicting 
concerns and comfortably resolve concrete cases has yet to be devised, notwith-
standing t~e fact that the issues have been before American courts at least since 
1890.9 
Thus, for example, in 1970 the Hawaii Supreme Court, in Rodrigues v. 
State,1O gave birth to a lusty new and independent cause of action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. Although it imposed a requirement that the 
distress (both that which was foreseeable to defendant and that which plaintiff 
actually suffered) be "serious," the court was satisfied to allow general principles 
of liability for negligence to determine who should recover and who should 
not. Thus the court moved beyond other American courts, which had long 
imposed arbitrary barriers upon the scope of liability, and, by imposing the 
seriousness requirements, seemingly arrived at a fair compromise of the com-
peting concerns. 
For a while the cause of action in Hawaii was allowed to flourish and grow 
along lines consistent with its bountiful origins. II Then, in 1975, in Kelley v. 
Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd., 12 the court stunted its growth by denying recovery 
to plaintiffs who, when they suffered the distress, were not "located within a 
reasonable distance from the scene of the accident." 13 Thus, the fear of imposing 
generally, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, §§42, 43 (4th ed. 1911) [hereinafter 
cited as PROSSERj. 
7 "The importance of the proximate cause issue in most litigation is surprisingly small, but few 
topics have been so much the darling of the academic mind. Almost every tort scholar has tried at 
some time to make his peace with the issue, and its doctrinal fascination continues." C. GREGORY, 
H. KALVEN, R. EpSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 250 (3rd ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as 
GREGORY, KALVEN & EpSTEINj. The major books and articles are cited id. at 250-51. 
" See id. at 256; PROSSER, supra note 6, §54 at 321-35. 
9 See Hill v. Kimball, 13 S.W. 59 (Tex. 1890), discussed in Hallen, Hill v. Kimball-A Milepost 
in the Law, 12 TEX. L. REV. I (1933). The concerns were clearly identified in Spade v. Lynn & 
Boston R. Co., 168 Mass. 285,41 N.E. 88 (1891), the leading case imposing the "impact" rule. 
\0 52 Haw. 156, 412 P.2d 509 (1910), facts stated in text infra at 6. Perceptive discussions of 
Rodrigues are contained in Koshiba, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: Rodrigues v. State and 
Leong v. Takasaki, II HAW. B.1. 29 (1914) and Brott, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm, 11d. 
148 (\911). 
\I See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 158 (1914), facts stated in text infra at pp. 1-8 
and discussed in Koshiba, supra note 10. Cf Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 54 Haw. 18,22,501 P.2d 
368,314 (1912) (plaintiff entitled to recover for mental distress "where a contract is breached in a 
wanton or reckless manner as to result in a tortious injury .... "), and Farrior v. Payton, 51 Haw. 
620, 632, 562 P.2d 119, 181 (1911) (citing Rodrigues to support proposition that defendant who 
seriously frightens plaintiffs, causing them to suffer physical injuries, in the attempt to escape 
danger may have breached a duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of serious mental distress). 
12 56 Haw. 204, 532 P.2d 613 (1915), facts stated in text infra at p. 9. 
13 /d., 56 Haw. at 209, 532 P.2d at 616. 
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"an undue measure of responsibility upon those who are guilty only of 
unintentional negligence"14 again manifested itself. 
The question thus arises whether it is possible for the judicial process to 
produce an approach to recovery for mental-distress-without-impact that will 
satisfy the competing concerns of justice and policy. In my view, which I will 
develop in considerable detail in this article, the answer is "yes," but only if the 
courts are willing to couple the application of ordinary negligence principles 
for determining the issue of liability with a significant reduction in the damages 
available ifliability is imposed. In this way the "punishment can be made to fit 
the crime" and other important policies will be served as well. . . 
My analysis will proceed in the following way: In Part 115 I will examine the 
general trend of decisions with respect to the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress and will engage in a fairly conventional analysis of the likely impact of 
Rodrigues and its progeny on future emotional distress cases in Hawaii. In Part 
W6 I will explore the implications of the Hawaii cases in terms of relevant tort 
goals and public policy. In Part 11117 I will discuss issues of "legal process" 
raised by the majority opinion in Kelley and by the competing approaches-
duty vs. proximate cause-of the majority and dissenting opinions. In Part IV I8 
I will identify and describe the principal key to the search for a satisfactory 
solution-the need for proportionality, and in Part Vi!! I will suggest and 
compare alternative approaches to dealing with the problem and set forth my 
own recommendation. In Part Veo I will suggest reasons why judicial decision-
making is the appropriate way to implement my recommendation and in the 
conclusion21 I will advance additional important reasons why the suggested 
reform should be undertaken.22 . 
I. TRENDS OF DECISION 
A. General 
Except perhaps in cases where mental distress is unaccompanied by serious 
physical harm, the limitation of recovery for mental distress to cases where 
plaintiff suffers an impact no longer enjoys wide support among American 
courtS.23 On the other hand, most American""courts limit recovery for negligent 
14 Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 289, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897). 
15 Infra, pp. 3-16. 
16 Infra, pp. 16-28. 
17 Infra, pp. 28-33. 
18 Infra, pp. 33-36. 
19 Infra, pp. 36-43. 
20 Infra, pp. 43-44. 
21 Infra, pp. 44-47. 
22 I have focussed heavily on the Hawaii cases both because they are regarded as important by 
leading tort scholars and because they are well-suited to illuminate the general problem. 
23 GREGORY, KALVEN & EpSTEIN, supra note 7, at 957. See generally Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1337 
(1970), and Note, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in California 
and Other States, 25 HASTINGS LJ. 1248 (1974). But see Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So.2d 593 (Fla. 
1974) (no recovery for emotional distress in absence of impact unless defendant's conduct was 
wilful). 
The English courts have long rejected the "impact" requirement. Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., 
(1925) I K.B. 141 (CA. 1924). In its stead they have only required that plaintiff be within the 
foreseeable zone of mental shock. Boardman v. Sanderson, (1964) I W.L.R. 1317 (CA. 1961). 
Mental distress suffered by "the ordinary frequenter of the streets" who witnesses an accident, 
however, has been held not to be reasonably foreseeable by a driver. Bourhill v. Young (1943) A.C. 
92, 117 (H.L. 1942). A summary of the English cases is contained in Simons, Psychic Injury and the 
Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute Between New York and California, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 
I, 17-22 (1976). 
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infliction of mental distress to plaintiffs who suffer distress as a consequence of 
fear for their own physical safety-plaintiffs located within the "zone of 
danger,,24-and to cases in which the mental distress results in physical harm.25 
In Dillon v. Legg,26 however, the California'Supreme Court was confronted 
with a situation in whi.ch the arbitrariness and unfairness of the zone of danger 
rule was palpable: A child within the zone of personal danger would have been 
allowed to recover for mental distress produced principally by witnessing the 
death of her sister, but her mother, only a few feet away but outside the zone 
of personal danger, would have been denied recovery for her own mental 
distress. In response, the court rejected the zone of danger rule and determined 
instead to apply "the general rules of tort law, including the concept of 
negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability.,,27 
Its intention aside, however, the court fell far short of creating an independent 
cause of action for mental distress based on general negligence principles: In 
the first place, the court indicated that plaintiffs right to recover was condi-
tioned upon the liability of defendant for injury to the "primary" victim; the 
contributory negligence of the primary victim would thus defeat recovery by 
the plaintiff who suffered distress as a result offear for the safety of the primary 
victim.28 This requirement, of course, is inconsistent with general principles of 
causation.29 
Secondly, the court confined its ruling to the cases in which plaintiff's shock 
results in "physical injury."3o Widely accepted damage rules, applied in ordi-
24 [d. Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §436 at 166 (1966). 
25 PROSSER, supra note 6, §54 at 328-30; Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1337 (1970). Accord, RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §436A (1966). 
26 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912. 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). 
2, [d. at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84. 
28 [d. at 733, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76. 
29 The situation is analogous to that which occurs when plaintiff, a passenger in car A driven by 
driver A, is injured as a result of a collision produced by the combined negligence of driver A and 
driver B in car B. Even if plaintiff were precluded from recovering from driver A because ofa host-
guest statute or intrafamily immunity, he could still proceed to recover from driver B. (At least he 
could unless some mischievous and arguably erroneous application of the "both ways" test imputed 
the negligence of driver A to plaintiff and recovery was then barred by contributory negligence.) 
See Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 33 N.Y.2d 397, 308 N.E.2d 886, 353 N.Y.S.2d 414 
(1973), and see generally PROSSER, supra note 6, §74 at 488-91, and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §§432, 433A(2), 439. comment b. If plaintiff is allowed to recover under "the general rules 
of tort law," he should be able to proceed against either the actor who negligently threatened the 
person the concern for whose safety gave rise to plaintiffs distress or the person whose safety was 
threatened if that person negligently exposed himself to danger, or both. /d. 
Another variation from general principles is the implication in the Dillon court's language that 
plaintiff could not recover for her own mental distress unless the person for whose safety she was 
concerned actually suffered actionable injury: "In the absence of the primary liability of the tort-
feasor for the death of the child, we see no ground for an independent and secondary liability for 
claims for injuries by third parties. The basis for such claims must be adjudicated liability and fault 
of defendant; that liability and fault must be the f\JUndation for the tort-feasor's duty of due care 
to third parties who, as a consequence of such negligence, sustain emotional trauma." 68 Cal.2d at 
733. 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76, (Emphasis added.) This requirement would seem to 
preclude recovery when defendant negligently creates a situation where plaintiff develops great 
concern for another's safety and consequently suffers serious distress, but the other somehow 
escapes injury. 
Consistent with the general rules of negligence applicable in a jurisdiction adhering to the 
common law rule of contributory negligence, the court noted that plaintiffs contributory negligence 
would bar her recovery. [d. In a comparative negligence jurisdiction such as Hawaii, however, the 
negligence of the plaintiff should not entirely bar recovery unless plaintiffs negligence exceeds that 
of defendant, HAW. REV, STAT. §663-31 (1976). 
'"' 68 Cal.2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. This limitation was affirmed in Krouse 
v. Graham, 19 Cal.3d 59, 75-.76, 562 P.2d 1022, 1030, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 871 (1977). However, the 
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nary negligence cases where plaintiff suffers impact, comprehend no such 
limitation.31 
Finally, the court in Dillon articulated a series of factors of a sort that the 
courts were to consider "on a case-to-case basis,,32 to determine whether the 
shock resulting in injury to plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable, i.e., whether 
defendant owed a duty to plaintiff. These were: 
(I) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with 
·one who was a distance away from it; 
(2) Whether the shock was from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the 
(3) 
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with 
learning of the accident from others after its occurrence; 
Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an 
absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.:~l 
While factors such as these seem clearly to be relevant to the determination 
of foreseeability under general principles of negligence, the fact is that, as 
subsequent California decisions make clear, these factors have tended to be 
converted into requirements offoreseeability, imposed with only slight flexibility 
and used to deny recovery as a matter of law in cases where, under ordinary 
negligence principles, a court could reasonably find that the risk of emotional 
shock to plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable.34 
court there held that physical injury includes a serious shock to the nervous system that produces 
physical manifestations such as gastric disturbance. Accord, Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal.3d 
441,450,563 P.2d 858, 864-65, 138 Cal, Rptr. 302, 308-09 (1977) (rule extended to support denial 
of recovery for intangible injuries in action for loss of parental consortium). See also note 34 infra. 
31 That is, there is no requirement in such cases that plaintiffs pain and suffering, grief, 
humiliation, and the like produce physical consequences in order to be compensable. 
32 68 Cal.2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920,69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
33 [d. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. In D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 
810 (D.R.I. 1973), modified, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1973), the U. S. District Court, purporting to 
apply Rhode Island law, adopted the Dillon approach but added that the presence of plaintiff must 
also be foreseeable. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in responding to a question 
certified from the First Circuit Court of Appeals in an appeal from the District Court's decision, 
questioned the rationality and fairness of the requirement that plaintiffs presence be reasonably 
foreseeable to defendant. D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 656 n.7, 338 A.2d 524, 531 n.7 
(1975) (dictum). 
34 Thus, for example, recovery has been denied to a wife who first witnessed her paralyzed 
husband in the hospital emergency room but did not witness the accident that caused the paralysis, 
Deboe v. Horn, 16 Cal. App.3d 221, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971); to a mother who witnessed in the 
hospital the painful death of her child caused by a negligent diagnosis, Jansen v. Children's Hosp. 
Medical Center, 31 Cal. App.3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973); to a mother who arrived on the 
scene within five minutes of the collision that caused her son's injury, Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. 
App.3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977); to fathers who witnessed the childbirths that resulted in the 
deaths of the infants but did not actually witness the deaths, Justus v. Atchison, 19 Ca1.3d 564, 565 
P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977); and to parents who rounded a bend and came upon the scene 
of an accident in which their daughters were killed "before the dust had settled," Parsons v. 
Superior Court, 81 Cal. App.3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978). 
In effect, the California courts have imposed a new "impact" requirement by turning the second 
listed factor, "direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous 
observance of the accident," into a requirement for recovery rather than an element to be 
considered. Thus, shock produced by learning from others of an accident's prior occurrence will 
not support an action under Dillon and, although recovery may be allowed where plaintiff does not 
actually see the accident, plaintiff must perceive the event through his or her senses-must be a 
"percipient witness." Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977); 
Krouse v. Graham, 19 Ca1.3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977). Furthermore, recovery 
will be limited to distress produced by the shock of sensing the accident and may not compensate 
for "such improper elements as grief, sorrow, anger and retribution." [d. at 78, 562 P.2d at 1032, 
137 Cal. Rptr. at 873. 
In short, the promise of Dillon, except in cases virtually on all fours with its facts, is as dead as 
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The Hawaii Supreme Court, although believed by some commentators to 
have "adopted" the rule of Dillon v. Legg,:15 took a much bolder approach. In 
Rodrigues v. State36 plaintiffs had won an award in the trial court for property 
damage and mental suffering produced by the negligent failure of state em-
ployees to prevent flooding that damaged plaintiffs' new home.:l7 On defen-
dant's appeal, the court sustained the right of the plaintiffs to seek damages for 
the mental distress produced by the injury to their home. Rejecting the 
opportunity to hold that such damages would be allowed if "parasitic" to an 
actionable claim for negligent injury to property,38 the court instead decided to 
give "independent legal protection" to "the interest in freedom from negligent 
infliction of serious mental distress" and to recognize the separate existence of 
a duty to refrain from such infliction.39 "[T]he question of whether the defendant 
is liable to the plaintiff in any particular case," the court stated, "will be solved 
most justly by the application of general tort principles."40 
The concerns about fraudulent claims and unlimited liability that had been 
expressed by other' courts, as well as the dissenters' "disagreement with the 
policy of recognizing emotional ties to material objects" and concern about 
the hopes of the many plaintiffs whose claims have been rejected. The California cases are collected 
and discussed in Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App.3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978). 
35 E.g., GREGORY, KALVEN & EpSTEIN, supra note 7, at 970. 
36 52 Haw. 156,472 P.2d 509 (1970). . 
3. Plaintiffs had planned to move into their new home on the same day that the flooding 
occurred. The supreme court described the circumstances that produced the mental distress as 
follows: 
The Rodrigues' home was flooded to a height of six inches, the water causing extensive 
damage to the house and furnishings. Mr. Rodrigues reported that he was "heartbroken" and 
"couldn't stand to look at it" and Mrs. Rodrigues testified that she was "shocked", and cried 
because they had waited fifteen years to build their own home. 
In addition to other repairs they made on their home, the Rodriqueses spent approximately 
six weeks scraping damaged rubber carpets off the floor of the house with razor blades. The 
Rodrigueses took out a loan to pay for repairs and incurred interest charges on the loan as an 
additional expense. 
Id. at 159-60,472 P.2d at 513. 
The negligence found to exist by the supreme court was the negligent failure of the state to inspect 
and clear its culverts of sand in violation of its duty to prevent unreasonable interference to 
neighboring lands when taking measures to protect its highways from the hazards of surface waters. 
Id. at 162-67,472 P.2d at 515-17. 
"" Id. at 171,472 P.2d at 519. The court noted that allowing recovery for mental distress only 
when it is associated with another actionable wrong represents "law in a developing stage," quoting 
STREET, I FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906). It then expressed disapproval of the 
unevenness and inconsistency of the current scheme for protection against negligently inflicted 
emotional distress, stating: "We find little virtue in such a scheme," Jd. 
This portion of the court's opinion raises the interesting question whether the court was including 
within its disapproval the entire current scheme of awarding damages for mental distress (including 
shock, grief, anxiety, humiliation, and perhaps even physical pain and suffering) even when 
associated with negligently inflicted physical injuries. If so, the logical next step would have been to 
treat such claims as independent of the claim for physical injuries and to impose the same 
requirements of foreseeability and seriousness as the court imposed in the Rodrigues situation and 
in the pure mental distress cases. See text at notes 42 and 43 infra. Such an approach might tend 
to reduce significantly or even eliminate general damages in many cases where they are now 
routinely allowed. However, there has been no further indication since the decision in Rodrigues 
that the court intended to make such a revolutionary change in the well-accepted rule that, as to 
pain and suffering and other psychic effects, we "take our victims as we find them" and award 
damages accordingly. PROSSER, supra note 6, §43 at 261-63. 
39 52 Haw. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520. The court remanded the question of damages for mental 
distress to the trial court to allow it to apply the rule newly announced. It further instructed the 
trial court to exclude from damages any award for future "disruption of home and family life" or 
for ·'etc.," both of which had been erroneously included in the award below. Jd. at 175, 472 P.2d 
at 521. 
4°Id. at 174,472 P.2d at 520. 
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"vast potential for abuse inherent in such a theory of recovery,"41 were met, 
first, by imposing a requirement of seriousness: Serious mental distress to the 
plaintiff must have been "a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defen-
dant's act,,42 and recovery was to be limited to cases "where a reasonable man, 
normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental 
stress engendered by the circumstances of the case."43 
Secondly, the court shifted to the trier of fact, in its function of applying the 
"ability to cope" test, the responsibility for determining whether any of these 
concerns should limit liability in a particular case.44 In regard to mental distress 
occasioned by negligent injury to property, the court expressed its faith that 
"the jury, representing a cross section of the community is in a better position 
to consider under what particular circumstances society should or should not 
recognize recovery for mental distress.,,45 
Subsequently, in Leong v. Takasaki,46 the Hawaii Supreme Court reaffirmed 
both the general principles set forth in Rodriguei7 and the independence of its 
approach from that of the Supreme Court of California. In Leong, the ten-year-
41 [d. at 17S, 472 P.2d at 522. 
42 [d. at 174,472 P.2d at 52!. 
43 [d. at 173,472 P.2d at 520. In adopting this requirement the court adopted a standard similar 
to that applied to actions for intentional infliction of mental distress. [d. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §46, comment j (1965). 
4452 Haw. at 173,472 P.2d at 520. 
45 [d. at 175, n.S, 472 P.2d at 521, n.S. 
46 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). 
47 The holding in Leong differed somewhat from that of Rodrigues but the full significance of 
the difference is not entirely clear. In Rodrigues the court had required that serious mental distress 
to plaintiffs be reasonably foreseeable and also held "that serious mental distress may be found 
where a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental 
stress engendered by the circumstances of the case." 52 Haw. at 173, 174, 472 P.2d at 520. This 
latter requirement seemed to require a post hoc judgment based on the actual facts of the case as 
they turned out. In Leong, however, the court stated, after repeating the foreseeability test of 
Rodrigues: "However, our analysis in that case also focused on the foreseeability of the plaintiffs 
reaction. We now hold that when a reasonable plaintiff-witness to an accident would not be able 
to cope with the mental stress engendered by such circumstances, the trial court should conclude 
that defendant's conduct is the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury and impose liability on the 
defendant for any damages arising from the consequences of his negligent act." 55 Haw. at 399, 
520 P.2d at 75S-59. 
It is not clear whether the court was merely compressing the foreseeability-of-serious-mental-
distress test and the ability-to-cope test of Rodrigues into a single foreseeability test, or whether, in 
addition, the court was adding the requirement that plaintiff must have been a witness to the 
accident. 
The likely answer is that the court was merely trying to clarify the somewhat vague relationship 
between the two tests of Rodrigues. In Leong the court expressly stated: "[Tlhe standard of duty 
established in Rodrigues should be applied in the instant case on remand to determine defendant's 
liability." [d. The court's reference to a "plaintiff-witness" merely reflected the fact that in Leong 
itself the plaintiff was a witness to the accident. The lengthy discussion of the history of the mental-
distress-without-impact cases, and the relevant policy concerns, which seemed to repeat the 
reasoning of Rodrigues, was probably a response to the comment by Justice Levinson in his dissent 
in Rodrigues that since the majority in that case was composed of only one regular supreme court 
justice and two circuit judges sitting as substitutes, while the dissent was the product of two regular 
justices, the law of the case in Rodrigues would remain uncertain "until the full court sits and rules 
on another case of this nature." 52 Haw. at ISO, 472 P.2d at 523 (Levinson, J., dissenting). The 
opinion in Leong had the concurrence of the five regular justices. 
Finally, the court's somewhat confusing references to proximate cause in connection with the 
foreseeability issue seem to have been included for the purpose of preventing the trial courts from 
doing what the trial court did in Leong itself and what California courts are now doing: Treating 
the factors in Dillon as requirements for recovery and dismissing claims for mental-distress-without-
impact when one of the factors is missing, rather than merely taking these factors into account 
along with other circumstances in the case to determine whether the required degree of serious 
distress was reasonably foreseeable. 
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old plaintiff, apparently not personally within the zone of danger, witnessed 
the negligent running-down and killing of his step-grandmother.48 Plaintiff 
alleged nervous shock and permanent injury to his psyche, but no physical 
injuries.49 On appeal from a summary judgment for defendant, the supreme 
court reversed. The court asserted its disapproval of the requirement of physical 
injury "as yet another of the artificial devices to guarantee the genuineness of 
the claim"so and held that plaintiff could recover for mental distress alone, at 
least if evidence of medical or psychiatric witnesses were produced to support 
the claim. 51 In addition, the court made clear that factors such as those set forth 
in Dillon v. Legg to determine foreseeability and duty52 were not to be used by 
the trial court to bar recovery, but would be relevant only to determine the 
degree of mental stress suffered for the purpose of determining whether the 
amount of stress engendered was beyond that with which a reasonable person 
could be expected to cope.53 
While only a small minority of courts have followed Dillon or Rodrigues,54 
and most continue to apply the zone of physical danger limitation in cases 
where plaintiff claims mental suffering produced by negligently caused physical 
injury to third persons,55 courts seem to be less reticent to permit recovery in 
cases where defendant's negligence occurs when dealing directly with plaintiff. 
Such cases seem consistent with two recognized exceptions to the old rule that 
denied recovery for mental suffering in the absence of impact: negligence in 
transmitting a telegraph message that, on its face, gave warning that mental 
distress was especially likely, and negligent mishandling of a corpse.56 
Thus, for example, in Johnson v. State,57 the Court of Appeals of New York, 
which had refused in Tobin v. Grossman58 to expand liability by adopting 
4. The court expressly rejected the requirement that there be a blood relationship between the 
victim and the plaintiff: "[T)he plaintiff should be permitted to prove the nature of his relationship 
to the victim and the extent of damages he has suffered because of this relationship." Id. at 411, 
520 P.2d at 766. Cf, Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976) 
(foster mother allowed to recover for mental distress caused by witnessing injury to foster child). 
49 Plaintiff claimed that his grades in school dropped immediately after the accident and that he 
thought about the accident at times. 55 Haw. at 401,520 P.2d at 761. 
50 Id. at 404, 520 P.2d at 763. 
511d. at 413, 520 P.2d at 767. 
52 See text p. 5 supra. 
',;j 55 Haw. at 410, 520 P.2d at 765--66. The court also included the foreseeability of the plaintiffs 
and the victim's presence to the defendant as one of these factors. In O'Ambra v. United States, 
354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I. 1973), modified, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1973), the District Court added this 
factor to the factors listed in Dillon. The U. S. Court of Appeals certified the question of liability 
to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. That court, in turn, expressed disapproval of the requirement 
that the presence of plaintiff-mother who witnessed the death of her child be foreseeable. D'Ambra 
v. United States, 114 R.1. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975). In its opinion, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court quoted Rodrigues approvingly. /d. at 652, 338 A.2d at 529. 
, ... See, e.g., Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976) (citing Rodrigues and 
Leong with approval). See generally Simons, PSYfhic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental 
Dispute between California and New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. I, 29-32 (1976) (reporting the 
decisions that approved Dillon. Unfortunately, the author credited the Hawaii Supreme Court with 
adopting the "requirement" of the foreseeability of plaintiffs presence that had been adopted by 
the U. S. District Court in D'Ambra, see note 53 supra, but had only been mentioned as a factor for 
determining the degree of mental distress suffered in Leong). 
fi5 See generally Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1337 (1970). 
r.; See PROSSER, supra note 6, §54 at 328-30. "What all of these cases appear to have in common 
is an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from special circumstances, 
which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious." Id. at 330. 
57 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975). 
'''' 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969) (mother denied recovery for her 
own mental distress produced when her two-year-old son was seriously injured in an automobile 
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Dillon,59 nevertheless allowed plaintiff to recover for mental suffering occa-
sioned when d'efendant's hospital erroneously informed her by telegram that 
her mother had died. Though the court of appeals distinguished Tobin on the 
ground that a bystander to an accident was only injured "indirectly," while the 
recipient of the telegram in Johnson was "directly" injured, it is likely that the 
more important difference was that the potential scope ofliability-the number 
of plaintiffs-was limited in Johnson, but not in Tobin, to a pre-identified 
plaintiff. GO There was thus significantly less danger of unlimited liability in the 
situation posed in Johnson. 
B. Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd. 
Based upon Rodrigues and Leong, the facts alleged by plaintiffs in Kelley v. 
Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd. 61 presented a most appealing case for recovery: 
Plaintiffs' decedent, Mr. Kelley, suffered a heart attack and died shortly after 
being informed of the tragic deaths of his daughter and granddaughter and 
critical injuries to another granddaughter resulting from a collision between the 
automobile in which they were riding and a trailer truck. The fatal collision 
occurred when the truck's brakes failed and the driver was unable to stop the 
speeding vehicle on the Likelike Highway, a mountain road, as the truck was 
being driven towards Honolulu. Plaintiffs alleged that the various defendants62 
were negligent in manufacturing, maintaining, repairing, and inspecting the 
truck and its braking system, in issuing a safety sticker, in driving the truck, 
and in licensing the driver. 
Though plaintiffs' decedent suffered no impact from the collision, he alleg-
edly suffered serious mental distress produced by shock in learning of the 
deaths and critical injury of his own close blood relatives. Indeed, that distress 
allegedly produced his heart attack and death. 
On the other hand, although decedent learned of the accident on the day it 
occurred, he learned of it by telephone while he was present and residing in 
California. Thus, he did not witness the accident, he was not within the zone of 
personal physical danger from the collision, and he never personally saw the 
accident's gory consequences. 
Based on these facts, however, plaintiffs would seem to have stated a good 
cause of action under Rodrigues and Leong. If any of the defendants, by their 
accident occurring out of mother's presence but only a few feet away). Justice Breitel's opinion 
refusing to extend the scope of liability is an extremely articulate and well-reasoned expression of 
the difficulties involved in allowing recovery in such a case. 
59 Although the mother did not actually see the accident in Tobin, she would probably have 
been allowed to recover under Dillon. See Archibald v. Braverman, 215 Cal. App. 2d 253, 19 Cal. 
Rptr. 123 (1969). 
so "[Plaintifll was the one to whom a duty was directly owed by the hospital, and the one who 
was directly injured by the hospital's breach of that duty. Thus, the rationale underlying the Tobin 
case, namely, the real danger of extending recovery for harm to others than those directly involved, 
is inapplicable to the instant case .... " Johnson v. State, 31 N.Y.2d 318, 383, 334 N.E.2d 590, 593, 
312 N.Y.S. 2d 638, 643 (1915). 
6\ 56 Haw. 204, 532 P.2d 664 (1915). 
62 Defendants were the owner and operator of the truck, the manufacturer of the truck, the 
lessor of the truck's trailer, the mechanic for the truck, the estate of the deceased truck driver, a 
company on whose business the truck was involved, the owner of the service station that inspected 
the truck and issued a safety sticker, and the City and County of Honolulu and the State of Hawaii 
who issued the driver a license to operate the type of truck involved. [d. at 205, 532 P.2d at 614. 
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actionable negligence, had created an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of 
collision between the trailer truck and a passenger automobile under the 
circumstances alleged, it would seem to follow that such defendants could also 
be found to have created an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of serious mental 
distress, of a sort with which normally constituted persons would not be able to 
cope, to the very close relatives of victims who might be mangled in such a 
collision.63 At the very least, the facts as alleged seemed to present an issue for 
the trier of fact. The absence of plaintiffs' decedent from the scene of the 
accident seemed more than balanced by the high degree and serious nature of 
the risk foresee ably created.64 
'The court, however, chose to impose an additional limitation on recovery for 
emotional distress. It held "[T]he duty of care enunciated in Rodrigues and 
Leong . .. applies to plaintiffs meeting the standards stated in said cases, and who 
were located within a reasonable distance from the scene of the accident.,,65 
Since Mr. Kelly was more than 2,500 miles from the scene of the accident, 
plaintiffs could not recover. Summary judgments for defendants were therefore 
affirmed. 
Because "reasonable distance from the scene of the accident" is expressly 
stated to be the only new requirement for recovery added by the court in Kelley, 
it behooves us to inquire what effect that requirement will have on future cases. 
"Reasonableness" is an overworked and nebulous concept. Like the Shadow, 
it has "the power to cloud men's minds." When used to determine whether a 
person's conduct has been negligent, its meaning and utility are pretty well 
understood: It is a measure by which the trier of fact can prescribe an 
appropriate standard of conduct. In that familiar context, reasonableness is 
measured by reference to a specific quality, prudence, which we all have a right 
6:1 See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609,249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969). In denying 
liability to a mother who witnesses the negligently caused death of a child, Justice Breitel said: 
"[F)oreseeability, once recognized, is not so easily limited. Relatives, other than the mother, such 
as fathers and grandparents, or even other caretakers, equally sensitive and as easily harmed, may 
be just as foreseeably affected." [d. 24 N.Y.2d at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558. 
With respect to the difficulty of circumscribing liability "within tolerable limits of public policy," 
he stated: "Every parent who loses a child or whose child of any age suffers an injury is likely to 
sustain grievous psychological trauma, with the added risk of consequential serious harm. Any rule 
based solely on eyewitnessing the accident could stand only until the first case comes along in 
which the parent is in the immediate vicinity but did not see the accident. Moreover, the instant 
·advice that one's child has been killed or injured, by telephone, word of mouth, or by whatever 
means, even if delayed, will have in most cases the same impact. The sight of gore and exposed 
bones is not necessary to provide special impact on a parent. Again, the logical difficulty of 
excluding the grandparent, the relatives, or others in loco parentis, and even the conscientious and 
sensitive caretaker, from a right to recover, if in fact the accident had the grave consequences 
claimed, raises subtle and elusive hazards in devising a sound rule in this field." [d. at 617, 249 
N.E.2d at 423,301 N.Y.S.2d at 560. 
64 [d. 
65 56 Haw. at 209, 532 P.2d at 676. (Emphasis added.) The court held that defendants did not 
owe a duty to plaintiffs' decedent and stated: "[W)e hold that the appellees could not reasonably 
foresee the consequences to Mr. Kelley. Clearly, Mr. Kelley's location from the scene of the 
accident was too remote." Jd. 
The court also stated: "We further conclude, based on the facts of the case, that the proper law 
applicable herein is Hawaii law." [d. It seems unfortunate that in deciding the interesting conflict 
of laws issue the court did not further elucidate its reasons for applying the forum's substantive law 
rather than California's, or cite any authority to support its decision. It is by no means clear that 
application of Hawaii law was called for in a case like this under current approaches to conflict of 
laws. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT·OF LAWS §146, 175-80 (1971) and R. WEINTRAUB, 
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 219-24 (1971). 
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to expect from one another when we engage in activities that have a potential 
for causing harm.66 
In the absence of a reference point capable of being ascertained or established, 
however, reasonableness becomes an unworkable standard: Reasonable in 
relation to what? This, of course, is the difficulty with the court's "reasonable 
distance from the scene of the accident" requirement.s7 Against what criterion 
will the reasonableness of the plaintiffs distance from the accident be measured? 
If 2,500 miles is unreasonable, will one, two, or ten miles be reasonable? All 
other factors being equal, a person who witnesses an accident may suffer greater 
emotional distress than one who does. not, but for those who do not witness the 
accident or its immediate aftermath, there seems to be no significant difference 
between 2,500 miles and 250 feet. 66 
Thus, the import of the "reasonable distance from the scene of the accident" 
requirement, and indeed the impact of Kelley on future cases, can only be 
determined by reference to the court's purpose in imposing the new limitation 
on the scope of duty. That purpose, as the court made clear, was to avoid 
"unmanageable, unbearable and totally unpredictable liability" upon defen-
dants.69 Unfortunately, however, any restriction on the scope of liability per-
mitted by Rodrigues and Leong will tend to serve that vague purpose; and the 
shorter the distance deemed reasonable, the greater the likelihood that the 
defendant-protective objective will be served. On the other hand, the court in 
Kelley explicitly reaffirmed the independent duty of care it had created in 
Rodrigues and Leong, subject only to the newly imposed distance limitation.70 
A fair conclusion is that the court is not inclined to reimpose restrictions, with 
respect to distance or other factors, that it has already specifically rejected 
based upon the facts of those cases.71 At least, the court will probably not do so 
unless it determines that other limitations are insufficient to achieve its defend-
ant-protective objective. 
It also seems highly unlikely that the court intended to have the question of 
what constitutes a reasonable distance from the scene of the accident turned 
66 See generally PROSSER, supra note 6, §32 at 149-51. 
67 A similar problem may be discerned in the court's use of the phrase "reasonable man" in the 
test it set down to determine whether plaintiff might recover for mental distress: "[W)here a 
reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress 
engendered by the circumstances of the case." Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 173,472 P.2d 509, 
520 (1970). Here, "reasonable" obviously refers not to prudence but presumably to the degree of 
phlegm one possesses. Perhaps the better word would have been "ordinary" or "average." However, 
any confusion created seems to have been dispelled by the addition of the words "normally 
constituted." See Brott, supra note 10, at 151. Cf Comment, Negligently Injlicted Mental Distress: 
The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1257-58 (1971), where the author urges that 
defendant be liable "to a 'normal' plaintiff who possesses a reasonable degree of pre-existing 
susceptibility to injury." 
68 See note 63 supra. Where two plaintiffs each get the news by telephone, it is possible that the 
one who is more distant from the accident might suffer greater distress because the distance could 
prevent him from supervising the care of and providing comfort to the injured person. Thus, 
feelings of guilt and anxiety as well as grief, horror, and shock would be created. 
69 56 Haw. at 209, 532 P.2d at 676. 
70 Id. The court's language is quoted at p. 10 supra. The court also indicated that in "the factual 
context" of Rodrigues and Leong allowing relief only for serious mental distress sufficiently limited 
defendant's liability. Id. at 208, 532 P.2d at 676. 
71 These include requirements that plaintiff suffer a physical impact, that plaintiff be within the 
zone of physical danger, that plaintiff suffer distress produced by fear for his own safety, that the 
distress be produced by concern for the safety of human beings rather than property, that plaintiff 
be related by blood to the victim, and that the distress produce physical harm. 
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over to the jury to decide on a case-by-case basis. In Kelley itself the court 
treated the question as one of policy to be decided by the court under the rubric 
of the duty issue. Moreover, the vagueness of the test provides no clue that 
would assist the jury in determining what considerations it should take into 
account in determining what distance is reasonable. And even if the court 
informed the jury ofthe purpose it intended to serve by imposing the reasonable 
distance requirement, it would be grossly unfair to allow the decision in each 
case to turn on the question of whether the jury believed that liability arising 
out of the particular accident might be unmanageable, unbearable, or greater 
than the defendant could have predicted. Outcomes would then turn on such 
irrelevant matters as the amount of damage suffered by the physical injury 
victims, the number of close relatives and witnesses who might claim mental 
distress, and the amount of mental distress damages claimed in the particular 
case. The greater the likely damages the accident in question might produce, 
the closer the distance that would be deemed unreasonable-a curious result, 
indeed. 
Thus, it is inevitable that the reasonable distance rule will have to be clarified 
or changed by the supreme court if uniformity of application is to be achieved 
in the state's trial courts. Assuming the court continues to manipulate the 
distance requirement, rather than other factors, the clarified rule could extend 
recovery to plaintiffs located in Hawaii when the accident occurred within the 
state, at the most liberal extreme; could restrict recovery to plaintiffs close 
enough to the accident, or its immediate aftermath, to suffer a "contempora-
neous impact upon the senses,'.n at the most restrictive extreme; or could place 
the distance limit somewhere in between these extremes, as, for example, by 
requiring plaintiff to be present on the island on which the accident occurred 
or within a distance that would permit plaintiff to arrive at the accident scene 
before the wreckage was cleared away or the "dust had settled.,,73 
The only clues provided by the court as to where it might draw the line are 
ambiguous, at best: In Ajirogi v. State/4 the author of the Kelley majority 
opinion, explaining the court's handling of the duty question in the latter 
opinion, said: "In Kelley, if this court did not limit the 'scope of the duty of 
care,' the liability of the actor could have been premised on a world-wide 
basis.,,75 This statement may suggest a geographical limitation such as requiring 
the plaintiff to be located within the state, although other interpretations are 
possible. In the Kelley opinion the court quoted Prosser with approval. 76 
72 The current California rule requires such an impact. Justus v. Atchison. 19 Cal. 3d 564. 565 
P.2d 122. 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977). and see generally note 34 supra. The attempt to translate this 
rule into a distance requirement demonstrates the anomalies produced by focusing on distance 
alone. For example. a deaf and blind plaintiff close enough to suffer a contemporaneous impact on 
his senses but who suffers none because of his condition would be eligible to recover under the 
suggested rule if he experiences serious distress when the facts of the accident are communicated 
to him hours later. 
73 Recovery has been denied in California in a case where plaintiffs did not arrive at the scene 
until after the accident but before the dust had settled. Parsons v. Superior Court. 81 Cal. App. 3d 
506. 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978). 
74 59 Haw. 515.583 P.2d 980 (1978). 
75 [d. at 532. 583 P.2d at 990 (Kobayashi. J .• dissenting). (Emphasis added.) In Kelley itself the 
court expressed concern that language in Leong "could very well be construed to mean that the 
appellees owe a duty of care from [sic) the negligent infliction of serious mental distress upon a 
person located in any part of the world." 56 Haw. at 208. 532 P.2d at 676. 
76 56 Haw. at 209. 532 P.2d at 676. 
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Perhaps this can be taken as an indication that the limitations suggested by 
Prosser,77 which are unfortunately not confined to distance but include other 
factors such as relationship to the accident victim and the time it takes for the 
news of the accident to be brought home to plaintiff, are to be adapted to the 
distance requirement. Prosser's approach would seem consistent with the more 
restrictive rule, since he suggests that "it might be required that plaintiff be 
present at the time of the accident or peril, or at least that the shock be fairly 
contemporaneous with it. ... ,,78 
In view of the large number of tourists, armed services personnel, and recent 
in-migrants in Hawaii with close relatives overseas, limiting recovery for mental 
distress without impact to plaintiffs located within the state when the precipi-
tating accident or event occurs here would substantially reduce the potential 
number of mental distress awards. While in practical effect such a rule would 
probably have a parochial and exclusive effect since it would tend to favor 
relatives of longer-term Hawaii residents whose entire families live wjthin the 
state, it would nevertheless operate evenhandedly to protect both local and 
nonlocal defendants, to benefit nonresident close relatives of accident victims 
who happened to be present in the state when the precipitating accident 
occurred, and to deny recovery to Hawaii residents who happened to be 
overseas when their loved ones were injured or killed in Hawaii. Furthermore, 
the drawing of such a line might be justified on the ground that persons located 
within the state, even on islands other than the one on which the accident 
occurred, are ordinarily in a good position to get to the accident scene, to the 
hospital, or to the morgue within at least a few hours after the accident occurs, 
. and are thus able to observe the carnage wrought by the accident or the 
immediate after-effects while the emergency is still fresh. Overseas relatives, on 
the other hand, would not ordinarily be able to reach Hawaii until community 
resources that deal with such tragedies already had been marshalled to conceal 
the more horrible aspects of the accident from view and to provide the spiritual 
comfort and psychological counselling designed to reduce or cushion the shock. 
Unfortunately, however, this justification for the in-state/out-of-state di-
chotomy would not apply to specific factual situations where factors other than 
distance might affect the length of time it takes plaintiff to arrive at the scene 
of the accident nor take into account either the manner in which the facts of 
the accident are communicated to plaintiff or the shock-producing capacity of 
those facts. Consider, for example, the possibility of a negligently produced 
airplane crash involving an inter-island flight. Close relatives and loved ones of 
the passengers and crew might be located anywhere in the world. Of those 
outside of Hawaii, some, learning of the crash by radio or telephone, might 
secur~ transportation that would bring them to Hawaii within hours of the 
accident. Others might actually see the aftermath of the accident on television 
within hours of its occurrence. And still others might even have been en route 
to Hawaii by plane when the crash occurred and would thus receive the tragic 
news and witness the accident's effects shortly after landing. On the other hand, 
those relatives located in Hawaii might be inaccessible and not learn of the 
crash until days after it occurs; or they might be unable, for a variety of reasons, 
to travel to the crash scene or to observe the injured victim, or his remains, at 
77 Supra note 6, §55 at 335. 
78 [d. 
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all; or, like Mr. Kelley, they might die or become immobilized as the result of 
shock immediately after hearing the tragic news. 
Thus, even assuming that a rule adopting the in-state/out-of-state dichotomy 
would, in the court's view, be sufficiently restrictive to avoid "unmanageable, 
unbearable and totally unpredictable liability," such a rule could only operate 
capriciously. The only "pute" distance rule that has any possibility of operating 
fairly and even-handedly in these cases would be one that requires distress-
without-impact plaintiffs to be close enough to the accident to suffer a contem-
poraneous or near-contemporaneous impact upon their senses,79 the more 
restrictive rule suggested by Prosser. 
It would seem to follow, therefore, that if the court is really determined, as 
it said it is, to apply the duty of care set forth in Rodrigues and Leong to 
plaintiffs "meeting the standards stated in said cases," subject only to their 
being "located within a reasonable distance from the scene of the accident," 
and if the court wishes to avoid invidious and indefensible distinctions between 
plaintiffs, it can hardly avoid adopting a distance rule located at the more 
restrictive end of the continuum. 
Indeed, the court will surely come to see that only a very restrictive ap-
proach-whether based upon distance alone or combined with other factors-
is capable of achieving the court's objective of avoiding untrammeled liability. 
This recognition will follow because the potential for such liability exists in 
almost every tase in which defendant negligently produces serious injury or 
death to accident victims. Where such serious consequences are reasonably 
foreseeable,so serious distress to all close relatives and loved ones of the victims,SI 
to eyewitnesses,s2 and possibly even to rescuers is also foreseeable.83 Even 
though in some cases the victim's close relatives and loved ones may be located 
outside the state, there are likely to be many cases where most or all of them 
will be present in Hawaii, perhaps even present on the island where the accident 
occurs and only minutes away from the scene. The prospect of extensive and 
excessive liability in these cases is produced by the likelihood that huge damages 
to the accident victim or victims will be combined with substantial awards to 
those who suffer serious distress and its attendant consequences.84 Only by 
79 But see note 72 supra. 
"" There will be cases in which the accident victims themselves will be allowed to recover for 
serious injuries even though the risk reasonably foreseeable to the defendant did not include 
injuries of such seriousness. See. e.g .• Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co., 104 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1939) 
(plaintiff teacher received from Sinclair an exhibit of petroleum products in which the bottle 
labeled kerosene actually contained water. Plaintiff suffered severe burns and lost an eye when, 
knowing that kerosene may be used to preserve raw sodium. he poured the contents of the bottle 
onto a piece of sodium metal). Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS §§435, 454 (1966). In 
these cases, risk of serious mental distress to third persons is arguably not reasonably foreseeable 
to defendants and, therefore, defendants will not be deemed to have breached their duty of care to 
thir? persons under the Rodrigues and Leong standar~s. 
8 See note 63 supra. 
82 See, e.g., Chadwick v. British Railways Bd. (1967)1 W.L.R. 912 (widow of man who suffered 
serious psychoneurotic symptoms as a result of his experience while serving as a rescuer at a 
gruesome train wreck permitted to recover). 
"" [d. Also if. Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921) ("Danger 
invites rescue."). In such cases, the court might invoke a doctrine analogous to assumption of risk 
to deny recovery. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 585, 565 P.2d 122, 136, 139 Cal. 
Rptr. 97, III (1977), where the California Supreme Court suggested that only involuntary witnesses 
to an accident should be entitled to recover. 
Il4 Damages might include the following: (I) awards for reasonable medical, surgical, and hospital 
expenses and related costs, for lost earnings and earning capacity, and for pain and suffering to the 
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narrowly and arbitrarily limiting the number of plaintiffs able to qualify for 
mental distress awards in all cases can the court allay its principal concerns.85 
However, in cases where defendant would be liable only for negligently 
inflicted mental distress and its consequences, the court has significantly less 
reason for concern.86 In these cases recovery for mental distress would not be 
heaped upon primary recovery for other damages, and both the seriousness 
and the foreseeability requirements would narrowly limit the number of poten-
tial plaintiffs in all but the most unusual cases.87 Thus, except where an 
independent liability-limiting policy is discerned,88 the court should allow the 
plaintiffs in these cases to proceed on the general principles enunciated in 
Rodrigues and Leong without further restrictions produced by the concerns that 
moved the court to restrict the scope of liability in Kelley. 
physical-injury victims who survived; (2) awards to the estates and the wrongful-death-act benefi-
ciaries of physical-injury victims who did not survive for damages permitted under the survival 
statute and wrongful death act, HAW. REV. STAT. §§663-3, 663-7, 663-8 (1976); (3) awards to the 
estates and to the wrongful-death-act beneficiaries of serious-mental-distress victims who, like Mr. 
Kelley, die from the shock engendered by the accident for damages permitted under the survival 
statute and the wrongful death act, id.; and, (4) awards to close surviving relatives and loved ones, 
such as spouses, fiances, caretakers, and those with whom the victims were living in intimate 
relation, of the physical-injury victims, as well as to bystander witnesses, for all the damages, as in 
(I), above, produced by their serious mental distress. 
In Hawaii, where death ensues, the estate may recover the damages listed in (I), above, suffered 
by the decedent until the time of his death plus "the future earnings of the decedent in excess of the 
probable cost of the decedent's own maintenance and the provision decedent would have made for 
his or her actual or probable family and dependents during the period of time decedent would 
have likely lived but for the accident." HAW. REV. STAT. §663-8 (1976). In addition, the legal 
representative may recover the "reasonable expenses of the deceased's last illness and burial," and 
the wrongful death beneficiaries-the surviving spouse, children, father, mother, and any person 
wholly or partly dependent on the deceased person-may recover "fair and just compensation, 
with reference to the pecuniary injury and loss of love and affection," which includes items 
normally allowed in an action for loss of consortium as well as amounts that the beneficiaries 
would have received from the decedent during his lifetime. HAW. REV. STAT. §663-3 (1976). 
85 Unless an entirely different approach is taken. See Part Y, pp. 3~3 infra. 
86 Such situations would include those where defendant's negligence consists of words or conduct 
that create fear for safety of self, see, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107,45 N.E. 354 
(1896) (plaintiff claimed to have suffered fright and subsequent miscarriage when defendant's 
driver of a horse-drawn car pulled up to her and, when the horses stopped, plaintiff found herself 
standing between them); fear for the lives or safety of loved ones, see, e.g., Johnson v. State, 37 
N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975), discussed pp. 8-9 supra; concern for 
plaintiffs property or financial interests, see, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Langley, 314 So. 2d 324 
(Miss., 1975) (plaintilTsuffered mental distress when defendant bank negligently delayed retrieving 
the deposit that plaintiff had placed in defendant's night depository and that had become stuck in 
the mechanism); or that threaten harm to other important interests of plaintiff, see, e.g., Corrigal 
v. Ball and Dodd Funeral Home, Inc., 89 Wash. 2d 959, 577 P.2d 580 (1978) (defendant funeral 
home was alleged to have contracted with mother to deliver ashes of her son in an urn. Plaintiff 
received box from funeral home and opened it, expecting to find the urn containing the ashes. 
Instead, she found a package that seemed to contain packing material. She sifted through the 
material looking for the urn and then suddenly realized that the material was her son's ashes), but 
where the subject of plaintiffs concern suffers no actionable injury. 
87 Such as negligent conduct that causes a bus or theatre full of people to fear for their own 
safety, or where all the members of a large family receive erroneous information reporting serious 
harm to a loved one as a result of defendant's negligence in transmitting a message. Such situations 
could present the "hard cases," which might impel courts to make further inroads into the right to 
recover for emotional distress even in cases where there are no "primary" victims. 
Il>l It is unlikely that courts will allow the independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress to be used to circumvent requirements for, limitations to, or defenses against other torts 
where such requirements, limitations, or defenses are seen to serve important objectives. Thus, for 
example, aggrieved medical malpractice defendants have not succeeded in by-passing the stringent 
requirements of the tort of malicious prosecution, which serve the purpose of protecting honest 
litigants who are seeking justice, see generally PROSSER, supra note 6, at 851, by suing for negligent 
infliction of mental distress. See 3 PROF. LIAB. REP. 137 (1979) and authorities there cited. See 
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The Rodrigues-type situation, in which plaintiffs claim emotional distress 
occasioned by injury to property, presents an interesting hybrid. In general, the 
potential liability for property damage and for mental distress produced thereby 
is not nearly so great as in personal injury cases. Furthermore, the court's 
seriousness and foreseeability requirements would tend to impose significant 
limits on the number and range of plaintiffs who might recover for emotional 
distress produced by injury to property. Thus the potential for untrammeled 
and unreasonably burdensome liability in property damage cases is low com~ 
pared to that in personal injury cases. Nevertheless, it would be surprising if 
the court in the future permits recovery for mental suff~ring occasioned by 
injury to property in situations where such recovery will not be allowed if 
occasioned by injury to the person. Were it to do so, the court might be 
perceived as giving greater protection to emotional attachment to property than 
to concern for human life.89 
The post-Kelley prognosis, therefore, is that in cases of mental distress 
occasioned by injury to third persons and property, the Hawaii Supreme Court 
seems destined to adopt a more restrictive approach, similar to if not quite as 
limiting as California's "contemporaneous impact on the senses" rule, and thus 
to retreat further from the more principled and more generous approach of 
Rodrigues and Leong. 
Whether such a retreat is either necessary or appropriate, however, remains 
to be seen. . 
II. CONSIDERATIONS OF LOGIC, FAIRNESS, AND POLICY 
As many courts have noted-often when rejecting an expansion ofliability-
once an independent interest in freedom from negligently inflicted mental 
suffering is recognized, there is no logical stopping-place.90 There seems not to 
generally Birnbaum, PhYSicians Counteratlack: Liability oj Lawyers Jor Instituting Unjustified 
Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FORD L. REV. 1003, 1066-74 (1977). Similarly, it is unlikely that 
defenses and burdens developed under the first amendment to protect the public media in the 
defamation and privacy area will be lightly set aside when plaintiff includes a claim for negligent 
infliction of mental distress. C/, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974) (defamation), 
and Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967) (privacy). There is an interesting question whether 
publication of a piece of news or a picture that neither defames nor invades the plaintiffs privacy 
when the publisher knew or should have known that there was an unreasonable risk of seriotis 
distress to some readers or viewers (as where a particularly gory accident is depicted and the victims 
are identified on television before the next of kin have been notified) should be privileged, but it 
is beyond the scope of this article. 
The reaction of judges to claims that expansion of recovery for negligence be allowed to 
overcome restrictions on other pre-existing torts has never been more clearly expressed than by 
Justice Cardozo: 
If this action [for negligence) is well conceived, all these principles and distinctions [in actions 
for deceit), so nicely wrought and formulated, have been a waste of time and effort. They have 
been a snare, entrapping litigants and lawyers into an abandonment of the true remedy lying 
ready to call. The suitors thrown out of court because they proved negligence, and nothing else, 
in an action for deceit, might have ridden to triumphant victory if they had proved the selfsame 
facts, but had given the wrong another label ... So to hold is near to saying that we have been 
paltering with justice." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 186-87, 174 N.E. 441, 447 
(1931). 
"9 Cf. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 178-80,472 P.2d 509, 522-23 (1970) (Levinson, J., 
dissenting). 
90 See. e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 618, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424,301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 
(1969) ("Assuming there are cogent reasons for extending liability in favor of victims of shock 
resulting from injury to others, there appears to be no rational way to limit the scope ofliability."), 
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be any scientific basis upon which to draw the lines adopted in Kelley and in 
the California cases subsequent to Dillon v. Legg: In view of the unpredictable 
range of human reactions,91 it is not possible to assert with any certitude that a 
parent who witnesses the running down of a child will foreseeably suffer greater 
distress than a parent who comes upon the scene moments later, or, for that 
matter, than a Mr. Kelley, thousands of miles from the accident, who learns by 
phone that a daughter and granddaughter have been killed and another 
granddaughter critically injured. In each of these cases the degree of mental 
suffering is probably going to be very great indeed.92 And in each of these cases 
the precise nature and degree of the effect, whether mere primary response or 
traumatic neuroses,93 will depend on many factors,94 including the circum-
stances of the accident, the age of the victims, the nature of the relationship 
between the victims and the plaintiff, and the character, personality, and 
constitution of the plaintiff. However, what is reasonably foreseeable to the 
reasonably prudent person in modem society is that if he or she produces 
serious physical harm or death to a victim, the victim's loved ones are likely to 
suffer mental distress of a serious nature. Thus, to limit arbitrarily the class of 
plaintiffs who recover to percipient witnesses, to those who are located near the 
scene of the accident, to close relatives of the victim, or to those who will be 
foreseeably present at the scene, unfairly deprives deserving plaintiffs of 
recovery on grounds that cannot be sustained by logical analysis. Furthermore, 
to hold that defendants cannot "reasonably foresee" that plaintiffs such as Mr. 
Kelley, who are deemed to fall outside these categories, will suffer serious 
mental distress95 is to ignore reality.96 
But even if it be conceded that language, logic, and symmetry may sometimes 
be sacrificed on the altar of policy, the question remains as to whether sound 
policy requires the adoption of arbitrary cut-off lines. 
In Kelley, the loss occasioned by Mr. Kelley's distress-produced death was 
allowed to lie where it fell-on those plaintiffs, including his widow, who 
suffered pecuniary and other losses consequent upon his untimely demise. In 
refusing to shift the loss back to the defendants, the court implicitly gave 
primacy to the recognized tort objective of not discouraging useful enterprise 
by saddling it with unduly burdensome liability.97 Unfortunately, it did not 
and Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613,258 N.W. 497, SOl (1935) ("[T[he liability imposed 
by such a doctrine [allowing plaintiff not within zone of physical danger to recover] would ... enter 
a field that has no sensible or just stopping point."). 
91 See Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 
GEO. L.J. 1237, 1250(1971). 
92 See the excerpts from Justice Breitel's opinon for the court in Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 
609,249 N.E.2d 419,301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969), quoted in note 63, supra. 
93 See Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 
GEO. L. REV. 1237,1249-51 (1971). 
94 Id. at 1257, n. 114. 
95 Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204, 209, 532 P.2d 673, 676 (1975). 
96 Indeed, the writer of the Kelley majority opinion subsequently stated: "In Kelley this court 
dealt with the matter of foreseeability orily in connection with limiting 'the scope of the duty of 
care; and only incidentally concluded that the consequence to Mr. Kelley was not foreseeable." 
Ajirogi v. State, 59 Haw. 515,532,583 P.2d 980, 990 (1978) (Kobayashi, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). He then went on to suggest that where there is no policy reason requiring a limitation on 
the scope of duty, and more than one inference can be drawn from the facts, foreseeability should 
be treated as a question offact for the jury. Id. at 532.583 P.2d at 990. See also note 171, infra. 
97 "[T]he courts frequently have been reluctant to saddle an industry with the entire burden of 
the harm it may cause, for fear that it may prove ruinously heavy. This is particularly true where 
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burden its conclusion that liability would be "unmanageable, unbearable and 
totally unpredictable" with any supporting arguments or data other than to 
quote a paragraph from Prosser98 which is arguably inapposite to the facts of 
Kelley. It also failed to discuss other legitimate tort policies that might, on 
balance, have supported a different result. Although the court indicated that it 
had reevaluated "the various considerations pertinent to the question of an 
untrammeled liability,,,99 it did not expose the details of its reevaluation in its 
opinion. Its failure to do so is perhaps understandable: loo Appellate courts are 
not as well-suited as legislative bodies to ferret out all the complex data that 
would provide the basis for rational policy-making in a case such as this. 101 
Furthermore, gaps in the data, inconsistencies, and difficulties involved in 
assessing and balancing effects suggest that, ultimately, decisions such as this 
must necessarily be based less on rational analysis than on community attitudes 
and preferences-the felt needs of the times-as perceived by the justices. 
Nevertheless, it will prove useful to consider whether other tort law objectives 
might have been served by allowing liability in Kelley, and, if so, whether they 
might have outweighed in importance the "negative" objective of not overbur-
dening useful activity. These objectives include fairness in the distribution of 
losses, compensation to victims, and deterrence of accidents. 
A. Fairness in the Distribution of Losses 
If the line drawn to cut off Mr. Kelley's right to recover is arbitrary, as 
suggested above, then the goal of fairness in the distribution of losses was 
arguably ill-served by the decision. That is, that plaintiff's decedent was not 
located within a reasonable distance from the accident does not seem to be a 
satisfactory, principled answer to the question of why plaintiff Leong should be 
allowed to recover while Mr. Kelley and his beneficiaries should not. Recall 
that it was concern about unequal treatment of plaintiffs that led the California 
court, in Dillon v. Legg, to drop the requirement that plaintiff, in order to 
the liability may extend to an unlimited number of unknown persons, and is incapable of being 
estimated or insured against in advance." PROSSER, supra note 6, §4 at 22-23 (footnotes omitted). 
98 "It would be an entirely unreasonable burden on all human activity if the defendant who has 
endangered one man were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person 
disturbed by reason of it, including every bystander shocked at an accident, and every distant relative 
of the person injured, as well as his friends." PROSSER, supra note 6, §54 at 334 (emphasis added), 
quoted in Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204, 209, 532 P.2d 673, 676 (1975). Mr. 
Kelley, of course, was not a mere bystander, a mere friend, or even a distant relative (although he 
was a relative some distance away). He was the grandfather of two and the father of one of the 
victims. Prosser would probably have supported a denial of recovery to Mr. Kelley, however, 
because Kelley learned of the accident some time after it had occurred, and because Prosser felt a 
line had to be drawn "somewhere short of undue liability." PROSSER, supra note 6, §54 at 335. 
It is both interesting and suggestive to recall that similar concerns were expressed 137 years ago 
in another case involving the scope of liability for negligent conduct: "There' is no privity of 
contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person 
passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action. 
Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the 
most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue." Winterbottom 
v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109 (Exch. 1842). 
99 56 Haw. at 209, 532 P.2d at 676. 
100 But see note 249 infra. ' 
101 But see Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. 
REV. 265, 308-09 (1963). 
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recover for mental distress, must personally be within the zone of danger of 
physical harm. I02 That California has subsequently imposed other arbitrary 
distinctions that tend to support the decision in Kelley does not satisfactorily 
dispose of the argument that plaintiffs in Kelley were denied fair and equal 
treatment vis-it-vis other equally deserving plaintiffs. 103 
On the other hand, if Kelley is viewed in vaccuo, it is possible that the denial 
ofliability would coincide with the sense of rightness or justice104 of a significant 
segment of the community. In the first place, those who are inclined to accept 
the vicissitudes of life-the inevitability of accidents and the vagaries of fate-
may feel that "a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection 
than the law' could ever be.,,105 Such persons might deem it extravagant, 
unnecessary, and even unwise to seek to compensate victims of mental suffering, 
especially those whose injury does not result from direct sensory perception of 
the original tragedy. Their view would be supported, in the pure mental 
suffering cases, with findings of. psychologists that the litigation itself and the 
possibility of recovery may actually contribute to and intensify the plaintiffs 
mental reaction. I06 However, this attitude would seem more appropriate to the 
facts of Rodrigues and Leong, where plaintiffs claimed only mental suffering 
without attendant physical injury, than to the facts of Kelley, where plaintiffs' 
decedent suffered a fatal heart attack. 
Secondly, even those who are more sympathetic to compensating victims of 
mental distress may react neglltively to the apparent disproportionality of 
damages in relation to defendant's blameworthiness. Negligence is merely 
substandard conduct. It is no part of plaintiffs case to prove that defendant 
was indifferent or inadvertent to consequences-that defendant possessed a 
negligent state of mind.107 Thus, much of the behavior that is adjudged 
actionably negligent is merely the product of ordinary human fallibility-
"deficiencies in knowledge, memory, observation, imagination, foresight, intel-
ligence, judgment, quickness of reactiQn, deliberation, coolness, self-control, 
determination,· courage or the like" _lOB in a complex and danger-laden envi-
ronment. A defendant's actionable conduct, therefore, mayor may not be 
blameworthy in a moral sense. 109 Allowing enormous damages to flow from 
102 See p. 4 supra. 
103 Cf G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 294 (1970) (hereinafter cited as CALABRESI): 
"To the critic consistency, or apparent consistency, is not an absolute requirement ... within 
accident law .... For example, unjust pressures or undue costs might be necessary to achieve 
consistency. But apparently inconsistent treatment is not easily accepted by the public and must be 
explained both rationally and emotionally if a community sense of fairness is to be preserved." 
104 That is, the decision to deny recovery might be viewed as appropriate, fair, and consistent 
with community expectations. 
105 Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 
\035 (1936). See.also Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419,424,301 N.Y.S.2d 
554,561-62 (\969): "The risks of indirect harm from the loss or injury of loved ones is pervasive 
and inevitably realized at one time or another. Only a very small part of that risk is brought about 
by the culpable acts of others. This is the risk of living and bearing children," and Smith, Relation 
of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 U. VA. L. REV. 193, 228 
n. 128 (\944). 
1116 See Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 
GEO. L.J. 1237, 1261 (1971), and authorities there cited. 
107 PROSSER, supra note 6, §31 at 145, 146. 
108 Edgerton, Negligence. Inadvertence. and Indifference; The Relation of Mental States to 
Nef,ligence, 39 HARV. L. REV. 849, 867 (1926). 
"" "It is now more or less generally recognized that the 'fault' upon which liability may rest is 
social fault, which may but does not necessarily coincide with personal immorality." PROSSER, supra 
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merely negligent conduct runs the risk of unfairly penalizing a morally innocent 
defendant and of being perceived as grossly disproportionate to defendant's 
fault. It is for this reason, among others, that certain items of damage, such as 
lost profits, have traditionally been disallowed in negligence actions. 11O And, 
indeed, it may be the excessiveness of the potential damages in relation to the 
defendants' fault, rather than the possible unmanageability, unbearability, and 
unpredictability of the liability, that is the principal reason for the court's 
liability-limiting decision in Kelley, and that would justify denial of recovery to 
otherwise deserving plaintiffs on grounds of fairness. III 
Since I believe that disproportionality is the key to the problem of extending 
the scope of liability for mental disturbance, I will have more to say about how 
to deal with it in a later section of this article. 1I2 For the present, however, it 
should be noted that there may be cases in which the facts warrant or even 
compel an inference that defendant's negligent conduct was morally blame-
worthy, and Kelley may be one of them: Where defendant's activity engenders 
a great risk of serious physical harm or death, where defendant is clearly 
chargeable with knowledge of this risk, and where defendant clearly has had 
ample opportunity to consider the risk and to develop feasible means of 
avoiding it, a failure to avoid it would seem to justify an inference of lack of 
care, if not outright recklessness. 113 Thus, for example, if plaintiffs in Kelley 
could have proved that defendant truck manufacturer had been negligent in 
failing to provide a safer or even a fail-safe Qraking system for the truck and 
that this failure was a substantial factor in producing the accident, then it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that such proof would also have established a 
significant degree of moral fault. In that event, the added liability produced by 
recovery for mental distress might not have seemed excessively burdensome, 
disproportionate to the culpability, or unfair. 1I4 It would seem to follow, 
therefore, that if the court's legitimate concern was disproportionality of liability 
to culpability, then a more well-informed decision, and perhaps a fairer one, 
note 6, §4 at 18. Holmes would have agreed: "[T)he standards of the law are external standards, 
and, however much it may take moral considerations into account, it does so only for the purpose 
of drawing a line between such bodily motions and rests as it permits, and such as it does not. 
What the law really forbids, and the only thing it forbids, is the act on the wrong side of the line, 
be that act blameworthy or otherwise." O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 110 (1881). 
III) See, e.g., Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E. 2d 200 (Ohio App. 1946). See also James, 
Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 V AND. 
L. REV. 43 (1972) and Note, Negligent Interference with Economic Expectancy: The Case for 
Recovery, 16 STAN. L. REV. 664 (1964). 
III That is, the unfairness of denying recovery to a plaintiff on grounds that are arbitrary in 
terms of principle may be outweighed by the perceived unfairness of imposing a burden on 
defendant that seems much greater than his fault would justify. See Part IV infra at pp. 33-36. 
. 1121d. 
113 Posner even suggests that defendants' acts may be deemed "intentional" in such situations: 
"Most accidental injuries are intentional in the sense that the injurer knew that he could have 
reduced the probability of the accident by taking additional precautions. The element of intention 
is unmistakable when the tortfeasor is an enterprise which can predict from past experience that it 
will inflict a certain number of accidental injuries every year." R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LA W 66 (1972). Indeed, it appears that knowledge of the predictable risk plus deliberate failure to 
reduce it, in order to reduce costs, provided the basis for the jury's award of compensatory and 
punitive damages amounting to $128 million in the notorious California case involving the rupture 
and explosion of the fuel tank on a 1972 Pinto. Why the Pinto Jury Felt Ford Deserved $125 Million 
Penalty, Wall SI. J., Feb. 14, 1978, at 1,31. 
114 And conversely, the failure to impose such liability might be seen to result in total damages 
that are disproportionately low. 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS LIABILITY 21 
could have been made as to the scope of liability after the facts were developed 
at trial rather than after a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 
B. Compensation 
While it has long been an article of faith that compensation for accident 
victims is a major objective of tort law, 115 commentators have recently pointed 
out that, since tort law does not compensate for all accidental injuries, its real 
objective "is to determine whether to compensate, and if so, hOW.,,1l6 Under 
this view, "there is no presumptive injustice in the tort law solely because the 
plaintiff is denied compensation .... " 117 Rather, it becomes necessary, in order 
to de~ermine whether justice has been served or disserved in any particular case 
in which compensation has been denied, to inquire whether other identifiable 
goals of tort law have themselves been served or disserVed. 
1. Compensation as a means of achieving economic efficiency. One such goal 
suggested by Judge Learned Hand's much-mooted formula for determining 
negligence liB and further articulated' by Professor Posner is, in the latter's words, 
"to generate rules of liability that if followed will bring about, at least approx-
imately, the efficient-the cost-justified-Ievel of accidents and safety.,,1l9 If 
the costs of an accident are less than the costs of avoiding 'it, then the actor has 
no obligation to avoid it. Conversely, however, if the costs of an accident exceed 
the costs of avoiding it, the actor must pay for the accident. Under this theory 
the injured party is awarded his damages "as the price of enlisting [his] 
participation in the operation of the system."I20 
As Professor Posner points out, foreseeability plays an important role under 
this system: 
If negligence is a failure to take precautions against a type of accident whose cost, 
discounted by the frequency of its occurrence, exceeds the cost of the precautions, it 
makes sense to require no precautions against accidents that occur so rarely that the 
benefit of accident prevention approaches zero. The truly freak accident isn't worth 
spending money to prevent. Moreover, estimation of the benefits of accident preven-
tion implies foreseeability. 121 . 
It would seem to follow, therefore, that the goal of economic efficiency is 
disserved if reasonably foreseeable costs of accidents are not included in the 
calculation. In such event, actors would not be motivated to consider the real 
but excluded costs in deciding whether the costs to victims exceeded the cost of 
precautions. Since the Hawaii Supreme Court had already recognized serious 
mental distress as a cost of accidents, disallowing recovery for such distress in 
115 See, e.g. PROSSER, supra note 6, §2 at 6. 
116 R. KEETON & J. O·CONNELL. BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 242 (1965). quoted 
in Epstein. Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground. 56 N.C. L. REV. 643. 644. n. 5 
( 1978). 
117 Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, supra note 116, at 645. 
118 "[I)f the probability [of the injury-producing event occurring) be called P; the [gravity of the 
resulting) injury, L; and the burden [of adequate precautions), B; liability depends upon whether 
B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL." United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 
F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
119 Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29,33 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Posner). 
120 [d. 
121 [d. at 42. 
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Kelley when, policy considerations aside,122 reasonable persons could have 
decided as a matter of fact that Mr. Kelley's distress was reasonably foreseeable, 
seems inconsistent with the efficiency goal. 
This criticism, however, is probably not a very serious one. In the first place, 
the cases are legion in which courts have denied recovery for consequences that 
judges deemed, for a variety of reasons, to be too "remote," 123 but that economic 
theorists like Posner might deem to be foreseeable and non-"freaky" costs of 
the accidents that produced them. Denial of recovery in such cases seems 
inconsistent with the objective of economic efficiency as a theory of negligence 
law. 
In the second place, there is serious question, as I will discuss,124 whether 
heaping recovery for mental-distress victims upon damages already recoverable 
by physical-injury victims is likely, as a practical matter, to produce greater 
efficiency in cases like Kelley. 
Finally, it must be noted that Professor Posner deduced the efficiency goal 
from the "Hand formula" and then, with the benefit of hindsight, tested it on 
cases decided in an era, 1875-1905, when the goal was not well-recognized. 125 
During most of that period the principal expositor of the objectives of tort law 
was Holmes, in The Common Law. 126 As Posner himself concluded: "Holmes 
left unclear what he conceived the dominant purpose of the fault system to be, 
if it was not compensation."127 Unclear as Holmes' views may have been, they 
did not explicitly or implicitly include economic efficiency as a major purpose 
of negligence law. 128 It may therefor~ be argued that economic efficiency, like 
122 See note 96 supra. 
123 See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) 
(plaintiffs who suffered losses from relying on financial statements negligently prepared by 
defendant for a client denied recovery); Ryan v. New York Central R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 91 Am. 
Dec. 49 (1866) (defendant who negligently starts fire on own premises not liable to owner of 
adjacent premises to which fire spreads). 
Conversely, and even more destructive of Posner's thesis, is the likelihood, illustrated by the 
Pinto case, supra note 113, that a calculated attempt to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, comparing 
the economic value of predictable injuries to persons with the cost of safety measures designed to 
prevent the injuries, may result in liability for heavy punitive damages as well as compensatory 
damages if the analysis leads to a decision that adoption of the safety measures is too expensive 
and if, for that reason, the measures are not taken and injury results. 
124 See pp. 25-27 infra. 
125 See Posner, supra note 119, at 34-36. But Cf R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 99 
(1973) (Posner asserts that judges could hardly have failed to consider economic efficiency when 
searching for the standard of care). 
126 Supra note 3. 
127 Posner, supra note' I 19, at 31. 
128 See, e.g. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881): "The standards of the law are 
standards of general application .... But a more satisfactory explanation [than the difficulties of 
measuring the capablities of individual persons) is, that, when men live in society, a certain average 
of conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the 
general welfare." (Emphasis added.) 
The manner in which Holmes says the law will protect the general welfare seems inconsistent 
with the objective of economic efficiency. When persons who are incapable of making or acting 
upon a reasonably accurate cost-benefit analysis cause an inefficient accident, the inefficiency will 
be compounded by shifting the loss to them: The transaction costs will have to be added on to the 
already inefficient costs of the accident and, by definition, such persons cannot be deterred from 
causing similarly inefficient accidents in the future. This problem may be considerably more serious 
today than it was in Holmes' day because of the vastly increased complexity of modern equipment 
and of the enviornment in which such equipment is used coupled with a practical inability to shift 
to safer alternatives. See, e.g., D. KLEIN & J. WALLER, CAUSATION, CULPABILITY AND DETERRENCE 
IN HIGHWAY CRASHES 130-32, 140 (U. S. Dep't of Transportation, Auto. Ins. and Compo Study, 
1970). 
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compensation itself, is at best a salutory by-product of a system designed with 
still other purposes in mind. 
2. Compensation as a conditional objective of tort law. Professor Posner's 
theory that compensation is not a goal of the fault system is not universally 
shared by legal scholars. Thus, for example, Professor Calabresi, in his monu-
mental work, The Costs of Accidents, asserts that "compensation remains a 
fundamental aim of accident law." 129 Although the tort system does not purport 
to compensate victims of all accidents or all accident costs, the fact is that 
compensation produced by tort recoveries constitutes a major element in the 
total system our society has devised for reducing secondary costs 1:lO of acci-
dents. 131 If the tort system were abolished, we would have to devise other 
systems to fill the gap in compensation left by its abolition. Therefore, it may 
be more accurate to say that compensation-shifting accident costs from 
accident causer to victim-is a "fundamental aim" of accident law where the 
victim can show, as by proving negligence or a defective product, that our sense 
of justice would not be offended by removing the loss from the victim and 
placing it on the accident causer. In short, compensation is a conditional 
objective of accident law. 
Since the court in Kelley denied compensation to victims who might have 
proved that their losses were produced by defendants' fault, it is arguable that 
the conditional objective of tort law was disserved by the decision. It is evident, 
however, that the ability to prove negligence, causation, and damage does not 
exhaust the factors that are relevant to the question whether shifting the loss to 
defendants in this class of cases will offend our sense of justice. Considerations 
offairness and considerations relating to other tort law goals, such as deterrence, 
that may be affected by the decision also seem to bear on the question. 
Nevertheless, assuming it is correct that compensation of victims is an important 
aim of tort law, it the victim is capable of establishing a prima facie case of 
negligence and causation under general principles of tort law, the court would 
seem to bear a heavy responsibility to explain convincingly why such a 
deserving victim should go uncompensated. 
C. Deterrence of Accidents 
The objective of reducing accident costs, in the language of the economists,1:l2 
or of enhancing human dignity by reducing value deprivations occasioned by 
129 CALABRESI, supra note 103, at 44. 
130 Calabresi has divided accident cost reduction into three categories: Primary cost reduction is 
reduction in the number and severity of accidents, i.e., prevention of accidents or mitigation of 
their severity. Secondary cost reduction is concerned with reducing the societal costs produced by 
accidents, i.e., compensation, loss spreading, rehabilitation, and the like. And tertiary cost reduction 
involves reduction of the administrative costs of primary and secondary cost reduction. CALABRESI, 
supra note 103, at 27-28. 
131 Thus, for example, a study of recovery of losses suffered by persons injured in automobile 
accidents in the Washington, D. c., metropolitan area from April I, 1964, through March 31, 1965, 
revealed that of a total economic loss of $22,448,908, $9,624,799. or 42.9 percent, was recovered 
from automobile insurance. U. S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, COMPENSATION FOR MOTOR VEHICLE 
ACCIDENT LOSSES IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF WASHINGTON, D.C. 29, Table 14 (AUTO. INS: 
AND COMPENSATION STUDY 1970). While some of the losses recovered may have come from 
non liability, first-party automobile insurance, it is fair to assume that the greatest proportion of the 
$9,624,799 was paid as a result of liability insurance. 
132 See CALABRESI, supra note 103. 
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accidents, in the language of "policy-oriented" scholars,133 is clearly a major 
feature of community policy in the United States today. The recent development 
of an enormous body of statutory law directly regulating accident-causing 
behaviorl34 and the rapid growth of liability for injury produced by defective 
products135 are obviously reflective of such policy. 
Thus, to the extent that serious mental distress is legitimately included as an 
accident cost and considered as a deprivation of well-being, community policy 
would seem to support special efforts by the courts to deter the events that 
produce it. 
Imposing liability for mental distress on those who negligently produce it 
may achieve deterrence in two ways: First, it would create fear of the conse-
quences of liability-e.g., a civil suit and its attendant effects, a large judgment, 
an increase in insurance premiums or perhaps being rendered uninsurable 
(direct deterrence), and, second, it would raise the price of the distress-producing 
activity and thus encourage those engaged in it, or those using its product, to 
shift to less expensive alternatives through the operation of market forces 
(indirect deterrence).I36 Realistically, direct and indirect deterrence are not 
likely to be enhanced by imposing liability for mental distress unless certain 
conditions are present: 
Direct deterrence: In order to be deterred effectively by fear of the conse-
quences ofliability, the actor obviously must be aware of those consequences137 
and the consequences must be perceived as adding significantly to the negative 
consequences already perceived to follow in the absence of such liability. Thus, 
for example, the driver of the truck in Kelley, who is not likely to understand 
fully the extent of his liability for negligence and who presumably already has 
sufficiently strong reasons for avoiding accidents-the preservation of his own 
133 See generally McDougal, Jurisprudencefor a Free Society, I GEO. L. R~v. 1,15-16 (1966). An 
effort to compare the Calabresian approach, the law, science, and policy approach, and the 
conventional approach to judicial decisionmaking to the resolution of a hypothetical case is set 
forth in McClellan, Clarification of Tort Policy: A Comparison of the Common Law, Calabresian, 
and Lasswell-McDougal Approaches to the Resolution of Tort Claims, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 995 (1977). 
134 See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Act, 15 U.S.c. §§2051-81 (Supp. II 1972); Traffic and 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 138 1-43 I (1970); and Occ. Safety & Health Act, 29 U.S.c. 
§§65 1-78 (1970). See also SPEC. COMM. ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LEGISLATION, AMERICAN BAR 
ASS'N, AUTOMOBILE No-FAULT INSURANCE 22-25 (1978). 
135 See generally Symposium on Products Liability Law: The Needfor Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. 
L. REV. 623 (\978); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). 
136 For the purposes of realistically examining the deterrent effects of specific scope of liability 
rules, I believe a distinction between "direct" and "indirect" deterrence, as set forth in the text, is 
more useful than the distinction between "specific" and "general" deterrence used by Calabresi to 
describe the two approaches society uses to control the level of accidents. By specific deterrence 
Calabresi meant "collective" decisions as to "the degree to which we want any given activity, who 
should participate in it, and how we want it done .... The collective decisions are enforced by 
penalties on those who violate them." CALABRESI, supra note 103, at 68-69. Collective decisions 
would include regulatory schemes like OSHA and liability rules of courts. By general deterrence 
Calabresi meant "letting the market determine the degree to which, and the ways in which, activities 
are desired .... The general deterrence approach would let the free market or price system tally the 
choices." [d. at 69. 
Both direct and indirect deterrence, as I have defined them, would seem to fall within Calabresi's 
defmition of general deterrence since even an actor's "direct" fear of liability or of increases in 
insurance premiums involves an estimate of consequences that have an economic "cost" that would 
produce a market decision. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (1973). This is true 
even though the cost itself is imposed col\ectively, by the legislature or the courts. See CALABRESI, 
supra note \03, at 95. 
137 See J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 85 (1975). 
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life and possibly the loss of his job if he survives and is found guilty of negligent 
behavior-is not likely to be further deterred to a significant degree by the 
imposition of liability for third persons' mental suffering. He will probably not 
be made to pay the judgment and whatever fear of the economic consequences 
to his employer that may be generated is probably exhausted by his awareness 
that his employer will be liable for negligently produced physical injuries. 
On the other hand, the enterprisers who are involved-the truck manufac-
turer, the owner of the truck, the lessor of the trailer, the company charged 
with the truck's maintenance and repair, the driver's employer, the city and 
state that licensed the driver, and possibly the service station that inspected the 
truck-are, in varying degrees, more likely to have access to legal advice and 
are thus more likely to be aware of the expanded consequences of their 
negligence and to take greater precautions to avoid them. 
Realistically, however, it is probably only the larger corporate defendants, 
such as the manufacturer and lessors of the truck and trailer, who will see the 
danger of extended liability as of sufficient importance to increase their efforts 
to guard against future brake failure. The other defendants, if they are poten-
tially liable at all, 138 are likely to realize that they have little ability, by increasing 
their safety precautions to avoid added liability for mental distress, to influence 
their own insurance rates. And it is even questionable whether the large 
manufacturer or lessor will be influenced, since its potential liability for 
negligence and for strict liability to physical injury victims is already enor-
mous. 139 If the fear of that liability and its potential consequences has not 
already driven it to develop a fail-safe braking system, it is hard to see how the 
addition of liability for mental suffering could motivate it to do more. 
The lesson may be that extending liability to include third-persons' mental 
suffering, where the actor is already subject to heavy liability for negligently 
caused physical injuries, is not likely to be very effective in achieving direct 
deterrence. -
Indirect deterrence. In economic theory, loading the costs of accidents on the 
activities that produce them will raise the prices of those activities and affect 
market decisions about whether and how to engage in them.140 So-called 
"market deterrence" will be produced when rational consumers choose cheaper 
and, presumably, safer altematives. 141 
In theory, therefore, adding the cost of third persons' mental suffering to the 
liability of negligent defendants ought to result in considerable deterrence since 
virtually every negligently caused serious or fatal accident is likely to produce 
138 It is not settled whether the city or state could be held liable to third persons for negligently 
issuing a driver's license to the truck driver or whether the service station operator who issued a 
safety sticker for the truck could be held liable for his negligence. Cf M. SHAPO, THE DuTY TO 
ACT: TORT LAW, POWER, AND PuBLIC POLICY 34-37, 95-96 (1977). 
139 The recent much-publicized $128 million verdict against Ford Motor Company in the Pinto 
case, supra note 113, is illustrative, even though the trial judge deemed the verdict excessive and 
ordered a new trial unless plaintiff accepted a judgment of $6.6 million. See 1. HENDERSON & R. 
PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 7-8 (Supp. 1978). 
140 See generally CALABRESI, supra note 103. For a skeptical view of the relevance of theoretical 
economic analysis of risk allocation, see Gilmore, Products Liability: A Commentary 38 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 103 (1970). 
141 This description of the theory articulated by Professor Calabresi is grossly oversimplified but 
should suffice for the purposes of this analysis. For a more comprehensive description of his theory, 
see Ross, Book Review (G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1970», 84 HARV. L. REV. 1322 (1971). 
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one or more close relatives or bystanders who can legitimately claim damages 
for serious mental distress. 142 The costs of activities that negligently cause such 
accidents should therefore increase appreciably and this increase, in a rational 
market, should produce more "decisions for safety." 
Theory aside, however, there is serious doubt whether a decision to impose 
liability in a Kelley-type situation would achieve sufficient market deterrence 
to be worth considering. The ability of a single small state such as Hawaii, by 
expanding liability, to influence market decisions in any significant way with 
respect to the products of a major national manufacturer or the goods and 
services of a multinational corporation is, to say the least, questionable. Unless 
other states were to join with Hawaii-and the trend is clearly running in the 
other direction- 143 the general market effect of Hawaii's action likely would 
be de minimis. 
It is true, of course, that the potential of having to pay larger judgments in 
Hawaii courts might lead to higher costs in Hawaii for all activities potentially 
subject to expanded liability. Large self-insurers might increase their prices or 
try to reduce their activities in Hawaii. For the smaller companies, casualty 
insurance rate-making is not fine-tuned to reflect with accuracy the safety 
records or accident potential of each insured. Rather, it is usually based on past 
experience of an entire class of insureds and adjusted for trends as to claim 
frequency and size. Specific rules of tort law and their potential effects are not 
separately factored into the computation of rates. 144 But where the frequency 
and size of future claims cannot be predicted, either because of the relatively 
small size of the universe for statistical purposes or because of expansion of 
liability into uncharted areas, the actuaries may hedge their bets by adopting 
trend factors produced by statistics drawn from other states, often those with a 
higher incidence of accidents than Hawaii. 145 Thus it is to be expected that 
expanding the scope of liability to include plaintiffs such as Mr. Kelley will 
eventually produce higher casualty insurance rates throughout the state and 
that these rates are likely to result in premiums that exceed the actual increased 
cost of accidents. 
Ultimately, these costs will be paid for by the Hawaii consumer, either 
through increased automobile insurance rates or through the increases in the 
prices of goods and services that result when enterprisers pass on their increased 
costs through the pricing mechanism. Whereas in theory this increased cost 
should produce market deterrence-more perhaps than would be justified if 
the actual rather than the actuarially inflated costs of accidents were passed 
on-in fact the short range effect within Hawaii would probably be merely to 
inflate prices further without effecting shifts to safer activities. This unfortunate 
consequence would seem to follow because as to many of the affected enterprises 
there do not seem to be in Hawaii viable safer alternatives and the functions 
performed by these enterprises are essential. For example, in the foreseeable 
142 See p. 14 supra. 
143 See Part I, pp. 3-16, supra. 
144 See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The InSignificance of Foresight, 70 
YALE L.J. 554,560-74 (1961). 
145 This is what occurred in Hawaii with respect to the setting of rates for medical malpractice 
liability insurance. See DEP'T OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, STATE OF HAWAII, MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE: ISSUES, DISCUSSIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 117-36 (1976). See also Morris, supra note 
144, at 567, n. 37. 
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future truck transportation will undoubtedly continue to be the only practical 
means of moving goods within each island; shifting to rail or plane or barge or 
moving sources of supply closer to the market, within each island, is not 
practicable. Further, demand for passenger car transportation seems to be 
relatively inelastic and not noticeably responsive to rising insurance costs. 
Internalizing the costs of negligently inflicted mental distress is therefore not 
likely to achieve desired marked deterrence within the state in the short run but 
might produce undesirable effects by further increasing the prices of goods and 
services produced or sold in Hawaii and by putting Hawaii enterprises com-
peting for mainland markets at a competitive disadvantage beyond that which 
they already suffer. 146 
While the competitive disadvantage cannot be avoided unless, contrary to 
the trend, a parallel expansion of liability occurs in other states, increases in 
passenger car insurance rates resulting from expansion of liability in Hawaii 
could at some future point combine with higher fuel prices generated by energy 
shortages and higher auto prices generated by inflation to hasten the day when 
Hawaii citizens, in spite of their strong preference for the passenger car, would 
be compelled to shift to cheaper and safer modes of public transportation. 147 
Thus some long-range market deterrence might be served by expanding liabil-
ity, but the significance of this factor, when compared with general inflation 
and energy shortages, seems marginal at best. 
D. Summary 
The foregoing analysis has yielded conflicting answers to the question 
whether recovery for mental distress should be granted in cases like Kelley. 
Fairness, in the sense of equal treatment for those plaintiffs who cannot be 
distinguished on logical grounds from others who could recover for mental 
distress, argues in favor of recovery. 
In addition, the "conditional" tort law objective of compensation seems to 
have been disserved by refusal to allow recovery, since plaintiffs might have 
established the existence of the conditions-negligence, causation, and serious 
injury-on which it is premised. On the other hand, it is arguable-though the 
argument is weak where the mental distress victim dies of shock produced by 
the distress-that the sense of justice of a significant segment of the community 
would be offended by giving effect to the compensation objective and saddling 
the defendant with liability for mental distress in a case like Kelley. Of course, 
we really do not know what the community reaction to allowing recovery 
would be. In the absence of such knowledge, it would seem preferable to allow 
146 This competitive disadvantage is the result of high shipping costs plus generally higher costs 
for labor and land use in Hawaii than on the mainland. 
Since liability insurance premiums, compensatory damage awards, and related legal fees are 
deductible business expenses, however, at least a ponion of the costs shifted to enterprisers by 
increased liability will be "externalized," i.e., it will be passed on to general taxpayers and shared 
through the federal and state income tax. See I.R.C. 26 V.S.c. §172 (b) (1954), as amended by 
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, §371, 92 Stat. 2859. 
147 See Car to Take Back Seat to Other Transport, Honolulu Star-Bulletin & Adveniser, Mar. II, 
1979, at A-I, col. 2 (final ed.) (reponing conclusions of repon of the Office of Technology 
Assessment that energy shortages, highway carnage, and rising costs will stan to restrict America's 
reliance on the private automobile). 
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compensation when the general principles of tort law, which are already 
presumed to incorporate the general sense of justice of the community, would 
require it. That is, compensation should be allowed unless other policies, more 
important than fairness and compensation, clearly call for a different result. 
Applied from a perspective of pure theory, policies favoring economic 
efficiency and deterrence of accidents would also seem to favor recovery. When 
viewed more realistically, however, giving due weight to the limits of Hawaii's 
ability to affect large national and international enterprises or to find safer 
alternatives as well as to the fact that we are dealing with a situation in which 
potential defendants are already at risk of enormous liability for negligence or 
strict liability in tort to the primary accident victims, it appears that not much 
by way of economic efficiency, direct deterrence, or indirect deterrence will be 
added by holding defendants liable for mental distress in the Kelley situation. 
On the contrary, it is arguable that imposing liability could cause enterprisers 
and insurers to overreact and to impose higher prices for goods and insurance 
in Hawaii than the increase in liability would warrant. The practical result for 
the state, at least in the short run, could be to exacerbate a difficult economic 
situation without significantly reducing accidents or accident costs. 
III. LEGAL PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS 
The preceding analysis of the factors that are relevant to the question of how 
far the right to recover for negligently inflicted mental distress should extend 
does not yield a very clear answer to that question. The possible benefits and 
disadvantages of allowing or denying recovery are clarified but they cannot be 
evaluated or quantified and then placed on a scale that will automatically yield 
a satisfactory solution, deus ex machina. Although some limitation of liability 
seems justified, it is by no means clear that the "reasonable distance" rule of 
Kelley and the retreat to other arbitrary stopping places that seem likely to 
follow in Kelley's wake148 are appropriate ways to achieve the desired contrac-
tion. 
In view of the difficulty of evaluating the various factors and arriving at a 
judicially imposed solution by objective criteria, might not the best solution be 
to treat the issue as a question of proximate cause in each case and send it to 
the jury? An otherwise "deserving" plaintifr49 might more readily accept the 
rejection of his claim by his peers after having had his day in court than accept 
being barred from the courthouse entirely by fiat of the supreme court. 
The solution of treating the issue as one of proximate cause lurks behind the 
approach originally taken in Rodrigues and Leong and urged upon the court by 
the dissenting justice in Kelley itself.l50 Indeed, the dissenter in Kelley charac-
148 See pp. 12-16 supra. 
149 I.e., a plaintiff capable of proving that defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in 
producing plaintiffs serious mental distress. 
150 Taken at face value, the language of the court in Rodrigues and Leong and Chief Justice 
Richardson's dissent in Kelley seem to adopt the position that if the foreseeability test is satisfied 
(i.e., that "serious mental distress to the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of 
defendant's act," Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 174, 472 P.2d 509, 521 (1970)), then the only 
remaining question is whether "a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to 
adequately cope with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the case." Id. at 173, 
472 P.2d at 520. Under this view, whatever policy reasons there may be for limiting liability of 
defendants for mental-distress-without-impact are satisfied by affirmative answers to both tests. 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS LIABILITY 29 
terized Justice Andrews' dissenting opinion in Palsgrafl51 as "the better reason-
ing" in that case. 152 Justice Andrews' view of proximate cause, it will be recalled, 
was: 
that because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law 
arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. 
It is practical politics. 
and 
It is all a question of expediency. There are no fixed rules to govern our judgment. 
There are simply matters of which we may take account. ... There is in truth little to 
guide us other than common sense. 15:1 
If the jury were invested with the task of deciding the scope of liability issue 
in each mental distress case, presumably they could achieve whatever contrac-
tion ofliability their "rough sense of justice" would seem to require based both 
upon the facts of the particular case and the possible societal consequences of 
Presumably the only role left for a proximate cause analysis would be if defendant claimed there 
was a "superceding" cause. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §440 (1965). 
Yet in each of the three opinions there are intimations that more than mere foreseeability of 
serious mental distress and the reasonable person's ability to cope adequately with the mental stress 
engendered by the circumstances are to be factored into the decision. Thus, in Rodrigues. the court 
stated that the compelling reasons for limiting recovery to claims of serious distress. including the 
policy that the law should not penalize the "prime mover." are to be taken into account by the jury 
and the court in applying the "ability to cope" test. 52 Haw. at 172-173.472 P.2d at 520. With 
respect to the claim that injury to material possessions should not give rise to damages for mental 
distress. the court stated that "the jury, representing a cross section of the community is in a better 
position to consider under what particular circumstances society should'or should not recognize 
recovery for mental distress." [d. at 175 n. 8,472 P.2d at 521 n. 8 (1970). In Leong the court 
intimated that the issue is one of proximate cause. 55 Haw. at 410, 520 P.2d at 765. And in Kelley, 
the author of the earlier two opinions expressly approved the approach of Justice Andrews in 
Pa/sgraf which, as the excerpts quoted from Andrews' opinion clearly demonstrate (See p. 29, 
infra.), would bring a number of policy considerations into the test for proximate cause. 56 Haw. 
at 214,532 P.2d at 679 (Richardson, C.J., dissenting). 
Thus it is arguable that the real question in these cases is not whether a reasonable person would 
be able to cope, but whether plaintiff, for compelling reasons, should be made 10 cope with the 
mental distress. This is a typical proximate-cause-type issue. 
151 Palsgraf. v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 347-56, 162 N.E. 99, 101-105 (1928) (Andrews, 
J., dissenting). 
152 56 Haw. at 214, 532 P.2d at 679. Chief Justice Richardson's reaffirmation of the rules of 
Rodrigues and Leong in his dissent in Kelley seems, at first blush, inconsistent with his statement 
in that dissent that he concurs with the view of negligence espoused by Justice Andrews in Palsgraf. 
id. The Rodrigues-Leong approach seems more consistent with Justice Cardozo's approach in 
Pa/sgraf "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports 
relation: it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension." 248 N.Y. at 344, 162 
N.E. at 100. By creating an independent duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of serious 
mental distress, the Hawaii Supreme Court had extended the right to recover to all whom 
defendant's negligence foreseeably exposed to such serious distress. Andrews, on the other hand, 
while not insisting that plaintiff be within the zone of foreseable danger, would have considered 
foreseeability, along with other factors such as remoteness in time and space, to determine whether 
it was "expedient" to allow recovery. 248 N.Y. at 354-56, 162 N.E. 104-105. It is by no means clear 
that Andrews would have permitted recovery in a case like Kelley where decedent's injury was so 
remote in time and space from defendant's negligent acts. On the other hand, the logic of Cardozo's 
position would have required recovery if decedent was found to be within the zone of foreseeable 
danger of serious mental distress. 
The apparent inconsistency may be explained by noting that the language from Andrews' 
dissenting opinion quoted with approval by Chief Justice Richardson, when viewed without 
reference to the rest of that opinion, seems to suggest that the geographical distance would not be 
a barrier to a recovery. 
153 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1929) (Andrews, J., 
dissenting). 
30 UNIVERSITY OF HA WAIl LA W REVIEW Vol. I, No. I 
imposing liability. The jury, with its broad discretion to "adjust" damages to 
suit the justice of the case l54 as well as to deny liability altogether, could make 
the necessary Solomonic judgments on a case-by-case basis. When questions 
become too "political," too amorphous, and too open-ended to yield sensibly 
to arbitrary lines drawn by nonelected judges, is there not something to be said 
for permitting the democracy of the jury room to flourish? 
Something, perhaps, but not much. In the first place, under the rule as set 
down in Rodrigues and Leong the difficult issues would be buried under the 
trappings of the "ability to cope" test, which focuses on only one aspect of the 
problem. 155 Even if the jury were specifically instructed that the issue was one 
of proximate cause, the usual instruction is so vague and obfuscatory as to leave 
the jury with no real understanding of what is at stake. l56 Under either this 
instruction or an ability-to-cope instruction, there is little assurance that the 
jury would understand what they were really being called upon to decide. 
Then why not clarify the instructions? Why not read the jury a relevant 
excerpt or two from the Andrews' opinion or, even better, tell them precisely 
what the problem is, as well. For example: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this is a case where defendant's negligence may be 
found to have produced plaintiffs mental distress and its consequences, for which 
plaintiff is seeking damages. The question for you to decide is whether you, being 
representative of the wider community, believe defendant should pay plaintiff for 
those damages. In making your decision you should consider whether the distress 
suffered was so serious that a reasonable person, normally constituted, could not be 
expected adequately to cope with it and whether distress of such seriousness was 
reasonably foreseeable to a person in defendant's position. But that is not the end of 
your inquiry. In addition, you should consider whether the distress suffered by 
plaintiff was just a part and parcel of everyday life in our community, which each of 
us has to bear, and whether allowing plaintiffs to recover their damages in cases like 
this will impose unduly burdensome liability on defendants, discourage useful enter-
prise, raise liability insurance rates too much, add excessively to inflation, and the 
like. You, of course, are to decide how much weight, if any, to give each of these 
factors. As you engage in your deliberations, please keep in mind that all close 
relatives and friends of seriously injured accident victims, as well as the by-standers 
who witness gory accidents, may also sue to recover for their mental distress in this 
and other accident cases. 157 
The difficulties with this approach are evident: The jurors would be set adrift 
on a sea of complexity; their common sense would not help them to measure 
"'" "Allowing juries to reach general verdicts gives them wide latitude, especially in negligence 
cases, to apply their collective common sense, or popular prejudice, in reaching results." J. 
HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 302 (1975). 
\5f, See note 150 supra. 
"'" See, e.g., Stryker v. Queen's Medical Center, 60 Adv. 5866, n. 4,587 P.2d 1229, 1231-32, 
n. 4 (1978): The trial coun instructed: "The 'proximate cause' of an injury is that cause which in 
direct, unbroken sequence, produces the injury, and without which the injury would not have 
occurred. 
"The law does not say that there can be only one proximate cause of an injury, consisting of 
only one factor or thing, or the conduct of only one person. On the contrary, many factors or 
things, or the conduct of more than one person, may operate either independently or together to 
cause injury; and in such [a] case, each may be a proximate cause of the injury." 
157 This instruction would follow instructions on duty, breach of duty, and cause in fact or the 
"substantial factor" test and likely would be followed by instruction on damages. Its relative clarity 
and candor seem preferable to the technicality of the usual proximate cause instruction. See, e.g., 
note 156 supra. In this respect, it seems to be consistent with the popular movement, now 
incorporated in the Hawaii Constitution, HAW. CONST. an. XVI, §13, to translate technical 
"legalese" into common English. 
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and weigh the incommensurables. The court can tell the jury what to think 
about but, unlike the situation with respect to the issue of negligence itself, it 
cannot provide a workable model, such as the reasonably prudent person, to 
suggest how to think about it. 158 
Professor James Henderson has argued that complex issues of the kind 
involved here, produced by the desire of courts to "purify" the negligence 
principle, are beyond the limits of adjudication. 159 He defines adjudication as 
a social process of decisionmaking in which the affected parties are guaranteed the 
opportunity of presenting proofs and arguments to an impartial tribunal which is 
bound to find the relevant facts and to apply recognized rules to reach a reasoned 
result. ... The dominant mood in which a judicial tribunal approaches its task of 
decision is that of seeking, in accordance with applicable rules, the single right result 
in each case. 160 
Allowing juries to decide "open-ended" or "polycentric" problems,161 such 
as fashioning the scope of liability in a mental-distress case, Henderson argues, 
creates "decision-by-discretion" instead of "decision-by-rule.,,162 While even 
"decision-by-rule" may require the exercise of some discretion,l63 allowing 
juries to resolve "problems which tend toward the extreme on the scale of open-
ended polycentricity" will deny parties affected by the decision "the opportunity 
to participate meaningfully in the decision process."I64 Such a process, he 
believes, is "not adjudication, but an elaborate, expensive masquerade."I65 If 
courts persist in the folly of trying "to confront problems which are beyond 
their capacity to solve," the entire negligence system is in serious danger of 
being replaced by some other simpler and less expensive, but less just, method 
of compensating accident victims. 166 
Henderson asserts that in the run-of-the-mill negligence case, the polycen-
tricity of the negligence issue and the proximate cause issue has not proved 
intolerable, but that "complicating factors," which are present in many situa-
tions in which courts have in recent years rejected formalistic rules and tried to 
apply the general principles of negligence law, have vested unacceptable levels 
of open-endedness or discretion in the jury.167 
If'" See text at note 155 supra. 
159 Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND L. J. 467 
(1976) (hereinafter cited as Henderson). 
160 [d. at 469. 
161 [d. at 475. Henderson acknowledges that he borrowed the term "polycentric" from Professor 
Lon Fuller, who may have borrowed it from Michael Polanyi. [d. at 475 n. 23. Henderson uses the 
term to refer to decisions, such as planning the family vacation, that involve multiple factors and 
as to which no clear rules of decision are laid down. Appeals can be made to the head of the family 
by individual family members, but "in the end, bound by no legal rule of decision, [the head of the 
family) would be left to decide the case largely on his own, employing common sense, or instinct, 
or intuition." [d. at 472. "Instead of being arranged in an essentially linear manner, as are issues 
in a classically legal problem, the issues, or elements, in these problems are interrelated in such a 
way that sensible consideration of any issue, or element, requires the simultaneous consideration 
of most, or all, of the others." /d. at 471. See also Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' 
Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973). 
162 Henderson, supra note 159, at 476. 
163 /d. 
164 [d. 
165 [d. at 477. 
166 /d. at 525. 
167 [d. at 479. The complicating factors fall within three categories: "( I) the evaluation of a 
particular defendant's conduct may require an unusually complex, highly technical analysis; (2) the 
parties may be in a special relationship which must be taken into account by modifying the duties 
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The complicating factor in the mental-distress-without-impact cases, he 
argues, is that "practical considerations may compel courts to place limits upon 
the extent of potential liability for certain types of conduct." 168 These consid-
erations require the court "to plan social relations on a case-by-case basis," 
making "meaningful adversary argument ... difficult, if not impossible."169 
Because of these concerns, Henderson has been extremely critical of cases 
such as Dillon, Rodrigues, and Leong.17o On the other hand, he sees Kelley as a 
ray of hope "that a more formal and manageable, albeit more liberal, limitation 
on liability in these cases will eventually be worked out."I71 
Henderson's criticism, I believe, deserves serious consideration. It hearkens 
back to Holmes' view that "any legal standard must, in theory, be one which 
would apply to all men, not specially excepted, under the same circumstances. 
It is not intended that the public force should fall upon an individual acciden-
tally, or at the whim of any body ofmen.,,\72 However, the problem presented by 
open-endedness or jury whimsy in the mental-distress-without-impact cases 
does not seem to be as devastating to the objectives of the rule of law as it is in 
other areas of law. 
Weare not dealing primarily with cases, such as property or contract, 173 
where ability to plan one's conduct and predict the legal consequences is 
crucial. And the issue is not what conduct is likely to engender liability-the 
standard of conduct is known in advance-but how much liability will be 
produced if an actor's conduct is of the sort that is likely to produce some 
liability if harm ensues. In view of the "thin-skull" rule174 and the absence of 
a market for pain and suffering, personal injury damages have never been 
predictable by the individual defendant, but have traditionally been subject to 
chance and the sympathies and generosity of the jury.175 
Yet it must be conceded that the scope-of-liability issue in the cases under 
each owes to the other; and (3) practical considerations may compel courts to place limits upon the 
extent of potential liability for certain types of conduct." Id. 
"'" Id. at 515, 516. 
1<>9 Id. at 479, 4S0. 
17n Id. at SIS, n. 192, and 519. Henderson directed his main criticism at Dillon v. Legg, the 
California case, and erroneously treated Rodrigues and Leong as if they had followed Dillon. If, 
however, the decisions in Rodrigues and Leong are taken at face value, see note 150 supra, they do 
not seem to be excessively open-ended or polycentric at all; the question for the jury becomes a 
relatively straightforward one. Only if the "ability to cope" test conceals a variety of proximate-
cause-type issues do the decisions become subject to criticism on the grounds urged by Henderson. 
Id. 
On the other hand, Kelley's vague "reasonable distance from the scene of the accident" rule is 
expressly intended, in Henderson's words, to take into account "practical considerations" that "may 
compel the courts to place limits upon the extent of potential liability .... " Yet Henderson seems 
to approve of Kelley in spite of its obvious "polycentricity." Id. at 519, n. 195. One is therefore 
entitled to wonder whether Henderson's real concern is for the health of the "rule oflaw" or for the 
economic impact if defendants' liability is actually b~d on general principles of tort law. 
171 Henderson, supra note 159, at 519. Henderson adds: "I submit that the court is using 
foreseeability in some special, though as yet unarticulated, manner, and that several more cases 
should suffice to reveal the new limits on liability for fright without impact in that jurisdiction." Id. 
Compare my analysis supra at pp. 9-16. 
I7Z O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW ItO (lS81) (emphasis added). 
173 But cf Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 54 Haw. IS, 501 P.2d 36S (1972) (damages allowed for 
mental distress and disappointment where contract is breached in a wanton or reckless manner). 
174 See note 200 infra. 
175 Indeed, the setting of damages for pain and suffering and related psychic injuries bears some 
of the characteristics that Henderson would say attaches to polycentric decisions. See Jaffe, 
Damagesfor Persona/Injury: The Impact of Insurance, IS LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 219 (1953). 
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discussion seems unsuitable for resolution by the usual techniques of the 
adversary system; the elaborate and expensive judicial machinery we have 
created to perform the function of application of law can contribute little to 
assure a reasonably sensible, even-handed, and fair resolution of the issue from 
one case to the next. The "legislative facts" that, as the earlier discussion of 
policy suggests,176 are relevant to determination of the issue would rarely be 
presented, if they were presented at all, to the jury in a form they could 
comprehend and utilize. The opposing counsel would have to appeal to the 
jurors' sympathies, prejudices, and emotions, rather than to their reason as 
illuminated by the evidence. Indeed, the issue might as well be sent to the jury 
with just the admonition: "Consider everything! Be fair!" 
Nevertheless, if the issue is sent to the jury, the dispute will be resolved and 
a decision will be made. The court can impose some control on totally 
untrammeled jury discretion through use of additur or remittitur or by granting 
a new trial. The other issues in the case-duty, breach of duty, and cause-in-
fact-can be subjected to reasonable judicial control in the usual way. And the 
outcome will be a product of a judgment of the parties' peers, representing a 
community sense of justice, however visceral it may be. 
In the interest of preserving the rule of law, however, Henderson would seem 
to prefer almost any judge-made formal rule, even if arbitrary, that will avoid 
polycentricity. to open-ended jury discretion. 177 I confess to being unsure 
whether "equal injustice under law" is preferable to the "rule of jurors" and 
which of the two approaches is likely to bring the judicial system into greater 
disrepute. I do believe, however, that when faced with such an unsavory choice, 
courts bear an exceptionally heavy responsibility to engage systematically in a 
search for a response that will avoid, to the extent feasible, both horns of the 
dilemma. 178 This search entails a careful policy analysis designed to identify 
the concerns that must be satisfied and a willingness to engage in creative 
manipulation of strategies and sanctions that have the potential for satisfying 
those concerns. 
That such a search can yield a satisfying, if not a perfect, solution, I will try 
to demonstrate in the next three parts of this article. 
IV. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: THE NEED FOR PROPORTIONALITY 
Professor Henderson is clearly correct when he asserts that the barrier to 
application of ordinary negligence principles in the mental-distress-without-
impact cases is the complicating factor that "practical considerations may 
compel courts to place limits upon the extent of potential liability for certain 
types of conduct.,,179 If a fair and durable solution to the problems presented 
by these cases is to be developed, however, a sophisticated analysis of just what 
176 See pp. 25-27 supra. 
177 See Henderson, supra note 159, at 474. 
178 It seems to me that while the Hawaii Supreme Court in Kelley was trying to steer a course 
between "the Scylla of unlimited liability and the Charybdis of no liability," Comment, Negligence 
and the Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35. U. CHI. L. 
REV. 512, 517 (1968), the compromise adopted-the "reasonable distance from the scene of the 
accident" rule-unnecessarily combined both arbitrariness and open-endedness. 
179 Henderson, supra note 168, at 515,516. 
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these "practical considerations" really are seems essential; what the courts say 
they are cannot necessarily be taken at face value. 
Some of the concerns that once led the courts to deny recovery can be 
excluded at the outset: Fears of fraudulent claims and opening the floodgates 
to litigation are today rejected as valid reasons for denying claims even by 
courts that refuse to extend liability beyond the zone-of-physical-danger rule. 180 
Lingering doubts can be overcome by limiting liability to cases in which the 
distress produces physical injurylBI or by requiring medical evidence to prove 
the genuineness of the distress suffered. IB2 Essentially, however, the courts deem 
it inappropriate to close the courthouse door on valid claims simply because 
some invalid ones may slip through or because the volume of claims might 
increase. 183 
Although concerns about allowing recovery for mental distress that is "part 
and parcel of everyday life in a community" and that might better be dealt 
with by "toughening the mental hide" may still remain,l84 they can adequately 
be met, as the Hawaii Supreme Court demonstrated in Rodrigues,l85 by impos-
ing "seriousness" requirements with respect to the nature and degree of mental 
distress that must be foreseen and that must actually be suffered. 
The remaining concerns, which can be taken to be the courts' genuine 
concerns as they see them, seem to fall within the categories described as "the 
potential of unlimited and indefinite liability ... " and "the imposition of 
burdensome and disproportionate liability on the tortfeasor in relation to his 
culpability." 186 
While there is no reason to question the sincerity of courts that respond to 
these concerns by restricting liability, there is good reason to investigate an 
apparent inconsistency: Why do these concerns lead to denial or severe restric-
tion of liability in the mental-distress-without-impact cases but do not do so in 
those cases where defendant negligently causes physical injury to the plaintiff? 
Does not the "thin-skull" rule as it is almost universally applied also generate 
great potential for unlimited, indefmite, and burdensome liability dispropor-
tionate to the tortfeasor's culpability?IB7 In applying this rule, why do the courts 
focus upon the justice of requiring a negligent defendant to compensate an 
injured plaintiff for all his damageslBB while downplaying or ignoring these 
other concerns? One would assume that the same tort goals of justice, deter-
rence, and compensation, as well as the goal of not unduly burdening useful 
activity, should be applicable in both situations. 
If it is assumed that there is a rational explanation for the different treatment, 
a likely answer, both interesting and potentially useful in the search for a 
180 See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 616, 249 N.E. 2d 419, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 
559 (1969). 
181 [d. at 617, 249 N.E.2d at 423,301 N.Y.S.2d at 560. 
182 See, e.g., Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 412-13, 520 P.2d 758, 767 (1974). 
183 See PROSSER, supra note 6, §54 at 328. 
184 See, e.g. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E. 2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 
561-62 (1969). 
185 Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 172-73,472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970). 
186 Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 402, 520 P.2d 758, 761 (1974). 
187 See PROSSER, supra note 6, §43 at 260-63. The "thin skull" rule allows plaintiff to recover 
damages for unforeseeable consequences produced by interaction between defendant's negligent 
im~act on plaintiff and plaintiffs peculiar susceptibility to loss. /d. 
SB [d. at 263. 
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solution, emerges: As was pointed out earlier,189 it will often be the serious 
physical-injury cases that will generate independent claims for mental distress 
without impact. Because of the "thin-skull" rule, damages awarded to the 
physical-injury victims are likely to be enormously burdensome to defendant 
and disproportionate to defendant's fault, but full compensation to plaintiffs is 
tolerated in the interest of doing justice to them. The courts' reaction is best 
characterized by Prosser: "If the result is out of all proportion to the defendant's 
fault, it can be no less out of proportion to the plaintiffs entire innocence."I90 
But the problem of undue burden and disproportionality would be compounded 
and increased enormously if recovery were also extended in the same cases to 
mental-distress-without-impact claimants who would also receive the benefit of 
the "thin-skull" rule. What would make such an increase in liability seem 
intolerable to the courts is their perception that the negative consequences of 
compounding the disproportionality would outweigh in importance the consid-
erations of justice that would otherwise call for full recovery. These negative 
consequences would seem to be that the disproportionate recoveries, individ-
ually and in the aggregate, would be unfairly punitive and grossly overdeter 
useful, often nonblameworthy, enterprise. 
Thus, the critical problem that seems to have prevented the courts from 
unloosing liability for mental distress without impact is their inability through 
rule or principle to match defendants' conduct-its dangerousness, its blame-
worthiness, and even its utility-with the consequences the law imposes or 
refuses to impose. The courts seem unable either in individual cases or in 
general to adjust "the punishment to fit the crime." 
It is important to note, however, that when the overall scheme the courts 
have adopted is viewed from this perspective, the complete denial of recovery 
to any mental-distress-without-impact claimants who might otherwise recover 
under ordinary principles of negligence seems grossly unjust. That is, the 
considerations of justice that impel the courts to grant full recoveries to some 
claimants and to ignore dis proportionality and overdeterrence in those cases 
are completely overlooked in those distress cases that are held to be outside the 
orbit of liability, regardless of the seriousness of plaintiff's injuries. 
Furthermore, courts, by totally denying recovery to any class of mental-
distress-without-impact claimants, run a serious risk of denying recovery to 
deserving plaintiffs even in cases where there need be no concern with dispro-
portionality and consequent overdeterrence. For example, as was earlier sug-
gested,191 it is possible that in a case like Kelley proof that certain of the 
defendants were negligent might be tantamount to proof of considerable 
blameworthiness on their part. In such a case the danger that total damages to 
all claimants would be disproportional to defendant's culpability would be 
slight and, if the courts are to be at all consistent, should be held to be 
outweighed by the justice of allowing innocent plaintiffs to recover from 
blameworthy defendants. 
Nevertheless, the problem produced by disproportionality and its conse-
quences is a real one. And if recovery for mental distress without impact is also 
189 See p. 14 supra. 
190 PROSSER, supra note 6, §43 at 257. 
191 See p. 20 supra. 
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extended to cases of strict liability,192 the problem will be greatly increased. It 
is difficult enough to justify large awards for pain and suffering to the primary 
physically injured victims of defective products in cases in which defendant's 
negligence or other culpability has not been proven. 193 It would be much more 
difficult to rationalize huge damage awards based only upon mental distress 
and its effects. 
The need to build proportionality into the system, therefore, seems essential 
if an independent right to recover for losses engendered by serious mental 
distress is to survive. In the next section I will explore the means by which 
more proportional outcomes might be achieved. 
V. ALTERNATIVE ApPROACHES 
The failure of common law courts to recognize and utilize their ability to 
change procedural rules and to adjust remedies may contribute significantly to 
the difficulties they encounter when called upon to expand or contract substan-
tive rights. In such situations they tend to act as if their only choice is between 
full recovery or none at all, with the burden of proof remaining the same as in 
most other civil actions. The effect may well be to retard needed reform, to 
prevent the courts from experimenting with techniques designed to allay fears 
of the catastrophes changes might bring, and sometimes, as in the case of 
Rodrigues and Kelley, to replace old problems with equally troubling new 
ones. 194 
With respect to the scope of liability for mental distress, however, it seems 
clear that unless the courts can adjust the process or the remedy in order to 
achieve proportionality, as discussed above, the problem, though it is clearly 
appropriate for judicial resolution,195 will never be satisfactorily resolved. On 
the other hand, there are a number of alternative approaches that, when 
coupled with the requirement of foreseeability of serious distress and the 
application of general principles of negligence,l96 could assure more propor-
192 See Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App.3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977), discussed in 
Tuohy, Strict Liabilityfor Emotional Distress, 7 INCL BRIEF 24 (No.4 Aug. 1978). See also GREGORY, 
KALVEN & EpSTEIN, supra note 7, at 972. 
193 See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. 
REV. 363, 376 (1965): "[O)nce adequate compensation for economic loss is assured [through 
enterprise liability or social insurance), consideration might well be given to establishing curbs on 
such inflationary damages as those for pain and suffering. Otherwise the cost of assured compen-
sation could become prohibitive." (Citations omitted.) 
194 Another useful technique for mitigating the negative effects of changes in substantive law, 
often overlooked by courts, is prospective overruling. Legal scholars have long urged courts to 
utilize this device more creatively to avoid upsetting reliance interests. See Keeton, Creative 
Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463, 486-93 (1962); Levy, Realist Jurisprudence 
and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1(1960). 
195 See Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. 
REV. 265, 308 (1963). 
196 That is, liability could be established, as in any other negligence case, by the conventional use 
of foreseeability to establish duty, by proof of breach of duty, and by fulfilling other requirements 
of legal or proximate cause, as where intervening factors are present, without using any of these 
concepts artificially to serve policy concerns created because the case is a mental-distress-without-
impact case. The only concessions to the special nature of the case would be the requirement that 
"serious" mental distress be foreseeable and the damage limitations recommended infra in the text. 
The requirement that plaintiff has been within the zone of risk of serious distress is necessary in 
order to avoid recoveries where the risk foreseeably created is only trivial. If "serious" is deemed 
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tional results. All involve a reduction in damages available either to mental-
distress plaintiffs as a class or to individual mental-distress plaintiffs based on 
the facts of each case. 
A. The Case-by-Case Approach 
In each case involving the independent tort of mental distress, damages might 
be limited (I) to the serious distress and its effects that were reasonably 
foreseeable by defendant,197 (2) to that distress and its effects that an average 
person could be expected to suffer under the circumstances!98 or (3) to an 
amount that, when taken together with all the damages imposed upon the 
defendant, would not render the total award excessive in relation to the 
culpability of the conduct and the nature and magnitude of the risk that 
engendered liability. 
All three approaches have a surface appeal. All three would permit the jury 
to participate in the decision and to bring their community sense of what is fair 
and just to bear, sub rosa in the first two cases and explicitly in the third, on 
their decision. l99 The first two approaches would, of course, encroach upon the 
general damages rule that "we take our victims as we find them."200 If damages 
were limited, as in the first case, to mental-distress effects that were reasonably 
foreseeable to defendant, then a jury could find in a case like Kelley that though 
some distress and temporary consequences to Mr. Kelley were foreseeable, his 
death was not, and they could then award reduced damages. Under the second 
approach, if a successful plaintiff, because of abnormal sensitivity, suffered 
distress and consequent effects in excess ofthose a "reasonable person, normally 
constituted" would have suffered, the jury would not award damages for the 
excess. Again, in a case like Kelley the jury could find that Mr. Kelley's death 
was an abnormal reaction to the tragic accident that produced it, deny recovery 
for the death, and allow recovery only for what they find would have been a 
more "normal" reaction. 
too vague, it would not seem objectionable to require foreseeability of a degree of distress beyond 
that with which the average person should be expected to cope. Applying either test, the courts 
could be expected to find that a duty to very close relatives of accident victims, regardless of their 
location, exists in any case where defendant foreseeably created an unreasonable risk of death or 
serious bodily harm to such victims. Cf, Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 410-11, 520 P.2d 758, 
765 (1974) (court held that requirements of proximate cause would be satisfied if plaintiff proved 
that it was "reasonably foreseeable that a reasonable plaintiff-witness to an accident would not be 
able to cope with the mental stress engendered by such circumstances .... "). Where foreseeability 
of such distress is unclear, as where plaintiff is a bystander, a close friend, or a not-so-close 
relative-i.e., where "varying inferences" are poSSible-the duty issue should be sent to the jury. 
Palsgrafv. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 345, 162 N.E. 99,101 (1928). 
19, This approach may be best described by altering Cardozo'S famous rule to read: "The risk 
reasonably to be perceived defines the damages to be paid." Cf Palsgrafv. Long Island R. Co., 248 
N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928) ("The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be 
obeyed .... "). See Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic 
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193,303 (1944) (questioning the merit of the general rule that would allow 
recovery for plaintiffs more extensive and idiosyncratic injuries where defendant's liability rests on 
creating a likelihood of causing "nervous shock" in a test person of average resistance). 
198 Or, in the language of the Hawaii Supreme Court in Rodrigues. "a reasonable man, normally 
constituted." Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156. 173,472 P.2d 509. 520 (1970). 
199 See pp. 19-20 supra. 
200 Also referred to as the "thin skull" or "eggshell skull" rule. See PROSSER, supra note 6, §43 at 
260-63, and Comment, Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the 
Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 512. 519 n. 31 (1968). 
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The difficulty with both these approaches is not that they deviate from the 
"thin-skull" rule: While that rule may produce just results in cases involving 
physical injury, it is not so sacrosanct that it might not be sacrificed in order to 
yield greater justice in the mental-distress cases.201 Rather, the difficulty is that 
the range of what is "foreseeable" and what is "normal" is so elastic that such 
rules would be difficult to apply and would turn the trial of the damages issue 
into even more of a guessing game than it now is, reducing the likelihood that 
a significant reduction in damages to achieve greater proportionality would be 
achieved.202 Further, under the second approach the need for proof of what 
distress and what effects a normal person would suffer could produce an 
esoteric battle of experts on the effects of mental distress on normal persons, 
with an attendant increase in costS.203 
The third alternative, explicitly charging the jury to produce a damage award 
proportioned to defendant's fault is fraught with even greater difficulties. Since 
jurors would have to be aware of defendant's total liability, serious problems of 
joinder and proof of related claims would arise in cases where all the claims 
arising out of a single accident were not consolidated for trial. But worse, the 
open-ended ness of the task204 and the absence of clear criteria for decision 
would raise justified objections to the "lawlessness" of the process even more 
serious than those raised by sending the scope of liability issue to the jury.205 
Those objections would not be satisfactorily answered by pointing out that on 
occasion juries, acting on their own, adjust damages to match defen-
dant's conduct.206 
B. General Limitation of Damages in Mental-Distress Cases 
If the practical disadvantages of adjusting mental-distress-related damages 
by special rules on a case-by-case basis seem to be formidable, a simpler 
approach is available to assure the achievement of the goal of greater propor-
tionality: Damages in mental-distress cases might simply be limited in a manner 
2<11 Under Posner's economic efficiency rationale, it might be argued that defendants should not 
be made to pay for freaky and unforeseeable resulls of accidents. See Posner, supra note 119, at 42. 
2<rl However, neither using reasonable foreseeability of serious distress as a test to determine 
duty nor requiring that a normal person be unable to cope with the stress engendered by the 
circumstances as a condition of liability would seem to create as many problems as using either of 
them as a measure of damages; only a "yes" or "no" answer is required to resolve the issues of duty 
and liability. 
2<13 Such as expert witness fees, lawyers fees, and costs of administering the judicial system. 
2<)4 Including the likelihood that in cases of multiple defendants, as in Kelley, the blameworthiness 
of different defendants would require individualized verdicts if the damages were to be made 
proportional to each defendant's fault. Such verdicts would create problems in the area of 
contribution among joint tortfeasors that would make the problems created by comparative 
negligence pale in comparison. Cf HAW. REV. STAT. §§663-12, 663-17 (1976) (making provision 
for disproportionate fault in allowing contribution). 
205 See pp. 29-33 supra. 
206 There is here an instructive analogy to the criminal law process: Although most judges 
recognize that juries have the power, which they occasionally exercise, to nullify the criminal law 
by finding a defendant innocent in a case where on the proof he is guilty, and although many 
judges may applaud the existence of this escape valve from the rigors of the law in cases where 
justice cries out for its use, the suggestion that juries be explicitly instructed that they have the 
power to do justice by nullifying the law has evoked the most vociferous protests from the judiciary. 
See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENT-
A T1VE PANELS 235-48 ( 1977). 
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that permits easy calculation. Thus, dollar limits might be imposed on total 
awards or upon amounts recoverable for pain and suffering; awards for pain 
and suffering could be limited by formula to a percentage of tangible economic 
losses; or pain and suffering in such cases might be disallowed entirely, leaving 
plaintiff to recover only for past and future out-of-pocket economic losses.207 
Except for limiting pain and suffering to a percentage of tangible 10sses,208 each 
of the other approaches has in fact been tried in other contexts where limitation 
of damages seemed necessary.209 If the courts themselves are to effect the 
limitation, however, then only the last solution-denying recovery for pain and 
suffering-is available; the others all involve drawing arbitrary lines involving 
dollar figures or percentages, clearly an inappropriate task for the judiciary. 
Furthermore, damage rules that disallow recovery for pain and suffering have 
a venerable common-law history, as in property damage cases, deceit cases, 
and contract actions.210 Such rules may be out of step with modem trends but 
they seem preferable to fixed dollar limitations that unduly favor smaller claims 
or percentage formulas that assume a relationship between tangible losses and 
pain and suffering that does not necessarily exist. 
Thus, among the various altematives,21l restricting damages to tangible losses 
in most mental-distress cases where plaintiffs claim sounds in negligence or 
strict liability seems to be the fairese l2 and most amenable to judicial adoption. 
It also seems to be the approach that has the strongest chance of resolving the 
problem of excessive and disproportionate damages in a durable way. The 
restriction would not merely reduce damages for negligent infliction of mental 
suffering in cases where recovery is now permitted, but would involve an 
207 I use the phrase "pain and suffering" here to distinguish the element of damages that might 
be reduced or eliminated from damages that would otherwise be allowed if defendant were held 
liable for the tort of negligent infliction of mental distress. Pain and suffering includes shock, grief, 
anxiety, humiliation, and other mental disturbance, as well as physical pain, that would be 
compensable in a normal negligence action where plaintiff suffers physical impact. See PROSSER, 
supra note 6, §54 at 330; MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §88 (1935). 
201< Once recommended as a partial solution to the rising costs of automobile accident insurance. 
See, e.g., AMERICAN INSURANCE ASS'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND EVALUATE 
THE KEETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS 5 
(1968). 
209 For example, dollar limits have been placed upon recoveries for wrongful death damages in 
somewhat less than one-third of the states' death acts, PROSSER, supra note 6, § 127 at 910; see also 
IND. CODE ANN. §16-9.5-2-2(a) (Supp. 1978) (limiting liability in medical malpractice actions to 
$500,000); recovery for pain and suffering has been restricted in certain cases in states which have 
adopted no-fault laws, see e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §294-6 (1976) and see generally Alexander, An 
Update: State and Federal No-Fault, 3 INCL BRIEF, No.2 (1973); and damages in actions such as 
deceit, contract, and negligent injury to property have generally been limited to tangible economic 
losses and benefits. See PROSSER, supra note 6, §IIO at 733-36 (deceit); MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §145 at 592-98 (1935) (contract); Jd .. §124 at 470-77, Annot., 28 
A.L.R.2d 1070 (1953) (negligent injury to property). 
2\0 See authorities cited in note 209 supra. 
21\ Eliminating the "thin-skull" rule, i.e., limiting damages to those that are reasonably foresee-
able, in all negligence actions might generally produce greater proportionality but discussion of the 
issues which would be raised if such a major change in tort law were contemplated is beyond the 
scope of this article. Reducing damages by eliminating the application of the collateral-source rule 
in mental-distress-without-impact cases is another possibility. In conjunction with the elimination 
of pain and suffering it might provide additional assurance to courts that the effect of allowing 
recovery for mental distress without impact would not be disproportionately burdensome. See 
generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1343-54 (1956). However, discussion of the 
complicated issues involved in the abolition of the collateral source rule is also beyond the scope 
of this article. See Lambert, The Case for the Collateral-Source Rule, 3 TRIAL LAW. Q. 52 (1965). 
212 Cf note 193 supra. 
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important tradeoff: The arbitrary barriers to liability imposed by cases such as 
Kelley and the California cases would be removed subject only to traditional 
scope-of-liability limitations applied in all negligence cases.213 Predictably, 
many more victims of mental distress would be allowed to recover than are 
able to do so under existing restrictions/14 but awards would likely be signifi-
cantly lower than those now available. 
It may smack of irony to suggest that plaintiff should go uncompensated for 
pure mental distress when that distress is the gravamen of his action, but the 
approach suggested here nevertheless seems justified on grounds of reason and 
policy. 
Even though damages are restricted to economic losses, the action could still 
produce significant awards in many cases. Traumatic neurosis resulting from 
mental distress may produce temporary or permanent disability215 resulting in 
loss of earnings and future earning capacity and the need for hospitalization, 
nursing care, psychiatric assistance, and special drugs. Even the primary 
response to mental distress, such as "fear, anger, grief, and shock,,,216 might 
produce inability to function and require psychiatric or other medical attention 
or, as Kelley dramatically illustrates, even cause death. All of the economic 
losses engendered by these conditions would be compensable. Thus, the justice 
of the view "that as between an innocent plaintiff and a negligent wrongdoer, 
... the latter should bear the 10ss,,217 will be given reasonable, if not full, effect: 
No plaintiff qualified to recover under general principles of negligence will 
have to suffer the full brunt of economic losses produced by defendant's 
negligence.218 
On the other hand, denial of recovery for the mental distress itself gives fair 
recognition to the concern, described earlier, that it is beyond the capacity of 
the law to protect us from all of the mental stress produced by the fateful 
occurrences of life in a complex mechanized society. But when in fact the stress 
turns out to be serious enough to prevent the plaintiff from adequately coping, 
the tangible economic losses thereby produced will be compensated. Such an 
approach will also serve to allay the fear of fraudulent claims, to the extent it 
213 See note 196 supra. 
214 See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 616, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 559 
(1969). 
215 See Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 
GEO LJ. 1237,1250 (1971) and authorities there cited. 
216 Id. at 1249. "In all instances this initial mental reaction is subjective in nature and ofre\atively 
short duration, although its precise form and seriousness will vary according to the individual and 
the particular traumatic stimulus." Id. at 1249-50 (footnotes omitted). 
217 Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204, 213, 532 P.2d 673, 678 (1975) 
(Richardson, CJ., dissenting). See also PROSSER, supra note 6, §43 at 263. 
218 Attorney's fees would have to be paid out of the award, just as they are when pain and 
suffering is allowed. Thus it might make sense to legislate an allowance for attorneys' fees in such 
cases (Cf CAL. IOv.] CODE §1717 (West) (1973) (provides that attorney's fees may be awarded "in 
any action on a contract")), or to pass a statute adopting the formula approach, suggested above, 
which would award plaintiffs a percentage of their economic losses, roughly equivalent to the going 
rate for contingent fees, to compensate for "pain and suffering." However, every increase in 
allowable damages beyond tangible economic losses would risk retriggering the courts' fear of 
disproportionate liability. 
If mental-distress-without-impact claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents were covered by 
no fault insurance, as they well might be, see, e.g., the Hawaii No-Fault Law, HAW. REV. STAT. 
§294-3, 294-4, 294-10 (1976), then the no-fault benefits would ordinarily not be diminished by 
attorney's fees. Id., §294-30. 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS LIABILITY 41 
still exists, by requiring the plaintiff to prove tangible losses and by removing 
the added incentive that damages for pain and suffering might represent to an 
unscrupulous plaintiff. Mainly, of course, the limitation of damages will serve 
the purpose of permitting even-handed treatment of deserving plaintiffs while 
minimizing the chances that damages for mental distress plaintiffs, when 
combined with full damages for defendants' physical injury victims, will 
produce awards that are excessively burdensome and disproportionate to 
defendants' fault. 
From a policy perspective the recommended solution also seems sound: 
Actors, in order to avoid liability for negligence, will have to take account of 
the foreseeable economic losses to mental-distress victims as well as the total 
losses to foreseeable physical-injury victims in determining how much safety to 
provide. Greater direct deterrence will thus be provided, but not more than is 
justified by considerations of economic efficiency. In addition, secondary 
accident costs will be reduced219 if economic losses to mental-distress victims 
are restored in whole or in part and are spread through the insurance or pricing 
mechanism. Furthermore, although indirect deterrence will be served over the 
long run by increasing the costs of activities likely to produce serious mental 
distress, the increases are likely to be significantly lower than they would be if 
general damages were allowed. Inflationary and anticompetitive effects should 
be minimized since compensation for economic losses to victims who might not 
recover under existing doctrine is likely to be offset to a fair degree by a 
significant reduction in damages to mental-distress victims who are permitted 
to recover under present law. Finally, any residual anticompetitive effects of 
allowing recovery for mental distress upon an isolated or insular state such as 
Hawaii might be avoided if the state adopts the rule here recommended, which 
minimizes the concerns that have hitherto inhibited the expansion of the tort of 
negligent infliction of mental distress in other states, and if such other states 
follow suit. 
Questions remain as to whether the restriction of damages in mental-distress 
cases to economic losses should apply to cases in which defendant's conduct 
only produces mental distress and does not also cause actionable physical injury 
through impact to persons or property, whether general damages should be 
allowed in mental-distress actions where defendant's conduct justifies punitive 
damages, and how the recommended limitation should apply in wrongful death 
cases such as Kelley or in actions for loss of consortium. I will try to set forth 
briefly some ofthe considerations pertinent to the resolution of these questions. 
I. Cases in which plaintiff may seek recovery for mental distress but where 
no physical injury to person or property is associated with the claim may fall 
into two categories-those in which the mental distress is produced by conduct 
that endangers the safety of persons, including plaintiff himself,220 or property 
but where the object of plaintiffs concern does not actually suffer injury 
through impact, and those in which the mental distress is produced by conduct, 
often mere words, either directed to plaintiff or of the kind that defendant 
2," Importantly, the more serious effects of economic dislocations upon the families of mental-
distress victims who die, become disabled, or require extensive psychiatric care will be mitigated. 
C/, CALABRESl, supra note 103, at 42-45 (noting the importance of avoiding adverse economic 
eff~~ts on a victim's family through secondary cost reduction). 
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107,45 N.E. 354 (1896). 
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knows will affect plaintiff or someone in his position. In the first category is the 
situation where defendant negligently allows his truck to roll down a hill toward 
plaintiffs children while plaintiff looks on helplessly, but where by some 
miracle the truck narrowly misses the children. In the second category are the 
"telegraph cases,,221 and cases like Johnson v. State222 where defendant negli-
gently sends erroneous distress-producing information to plaintiff. In neither 
category is there a danger of excessive and disproportionate damages produced 
by heaping damages for physical injuries to person or property upon mental-
distress damages.223 And in neither category will deterrence policies be served 
unless the mental-distress plaintiff is allowed to recover damages. Thus the 
factors that incline us to limit damages to economic losses in the cases that 
involve physical injuries seem less significant in these cases. Although general 
damages might therefore be allowed in the second category, to do so in the first 
category would create a serious anomaly: The plaintiff in the hypothetical, for 
example, would be allowed to recover pain and suffering if her children were 
not injured by defendant's conduct, but would not be allowed to recover such 
damage if her children were injured. While this anomaly might be justified on 
theoretical grounds, it would be terribly difficult to justify on grounds of 
fairness. For this reason it seems preferable to limit damages in cases in the 
first category to economic losses. 
2. In cases in which defendant's conduct is reckless or wilful, thus justifying 
punitive damages,224 or even where it is grossly negligent, the award of general 
damages to mental-distress plaintiffs seems less likely to result in total damages 
that will be excessive in relation to defendant's culpability. In cases such as 
these, mental-distress plaintiffs should therefore be deemed eligible to recover 
damages for pain and suffering as well as economic losses.225 
3. In cases such as Kelley where distress produces death, existing wrongful 
death statutes may allow beneficiaries to recover for intangible losses as well as 
for pecuniary losses. Thus, for example, the Hawaii Wrongful Death Act allows 
compensation for: 
loss oflove and affection, including loss of society, companionship, comfort, consor-
tium, or protection, (2) loss of marital care, attention, advice, or counsel, (3) loss of 
filial care or attention, or (4) loss of parental care, training, guidance, or education, 
suffered as a result ofthe death of the person by the surviving spouse, children, father, 
mother, and by any person wholly or partly dependent upon the deceased person.226 
While such items of damage tend to embrace intangible losses rather than 
economic losses, they are of a quality different from pure pain and suffering.227 
On the other hand, they are losses suffered by third persons even more remote 
than the decedent in the chain of causation, and recovery by these people for 
such losses has as much, if not a greater, potential for expanding damages to 
disproportionally large amounts as does allowing pain-and-suffering damages 
to the immediate distress victim. A similar problem also exists if an action for 
221 See PROSSER, supra note 6, §54 at 329 n. 47. 
22237 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975). 
223 See pp. 14-15 supra. 
224 See PROSSER, supra note 6, §2 at 9. 
225 See p. 20 supra. 
226 HAW. REV. STAT. §663-3 (1976). 
227 See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal.3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977). 
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loss of consortium is permitted by the spouse of a mental-distress victim. The 
appropriate response may be to exclude the intangible elements of such 
damages228 except in those few cases, mentioned above, where a victim of 
mental distress would himself be entitled to recover pain and suffering. Sec-
ondary accident costs of an economic nature would thus be avoided but the 
possibility of disproportionate damages and the courts' related concerns would 
be minimized. 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION 
Appellate courts clearly possess the authority to prescribe rules of damages 
for the remedies they create.229 While in recent years the tendency has been to 
expand recovery to allow full tort-type damages, including pain and suffering, 
in cases in which the former remedy was limited to specified economic 10sses/30 
there seems to be no reason why recovery, in newly created causes of action at 
least, may not be limited to economic losses where such limitation is justified 
by reason and policy. Where, as in the case of negligent infliction of mental 
distress, the choice is between drawing a perpendicular line that arbitrarily and 
capriciously separates those who may recover from those who may not or 
drawing a horizontal line that evenhandedly allows all "deserving" plaintiffs to 
recover but limits their recovery, for good reason, to economic losses, the latter 
could hardly be faulted as exceeding the judicial prerogative or as an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of property or as discrimination.231 
While common law appellate courts possess the authority to adjust the 
remedies with respect to court-created rights, they have generally been reluctant 
to do so, especially when the effect is to modify the traditional "all-or-nothing" 
approach.232 This reluctance may be understandable where, as has been the 
case with the adoption of comparative negligence, a variety of relatively 
complex approaches is available, no one approach is clearly preferable to the 
others, no common law precedent exists to guide choice/33 and a change would 
necessarily leave a series of difficult questions to be answered by future 
228Id. See generally R. Keeton, Statutes. Gaps. and Values in Tort Law. 44 J. AIR L. & COM. I 
(1978). discussing how courts should interpret statutes affecting tort law. 
229 See generally GREGORY. KALVEN & EpSTEIN. supra note 7. at Ch. II. 
230 See. e.g., Dold v. Outrigger Hotel. 54 Haw. 18, 501 P.2d 368 (1972); Crisci v. Security 
Insurance Co., 66 Cal.2d 425,426 P.2d 173,58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). The expansion of damages is 
achieved in these cases by emphasizing the tort aspects of the case rather than the contract aspects. 
See generally Gilmore. Products Liability: A Commentary. 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 103 (1970), for a 
description of how courts move between contract and tort theories to shift the law into conformity 
with current theories of risk allocation. . 
23' Cf Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1.271 N.E.2d 592 (1971) (upholding constitutionality of 
Massachusetts no-fault law which deprives some injured persons compensation for pain and 
suffering). But cf Grace v. Howlett. 51 III. 2d 478.283 N.E.2d 474 (1972) (holding Illinois no-fault 
statute unconstitutional because it denied pain and suffering both to persons required to have first-
par~ protection and those not so required, thus denying equal protection to the latter group). 
2 Compare Makl v. Frelk, 40 I1l.2d 193,239 N.E.2d 445 (1968) with Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of 
California, 13 Cal.3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). Cf Bissen v. Fujii, 51 Haw. 
636, 466 P.2d 429 (1970) (court refused to apply comparative negligence to period before 
comparative negligence statute became effective). For a provocative discussion of the philosophical 
issues raised when the "all or nothing" rule is departed from by compromise, see A Symposium on 
Philosophy from Law: Compromise and Decision Making in the Resolution of Controversies. 58 N. W. 
L. REV. 731 (1964). 
233 Forms of comparative negligence had been judicially adopted at various times in different 
jurisdictions, see generally GREGORY, KALVEN & EpSTEIN, supra note 7, at 433-35, but they tended 
to be sufficiently different so that a court deciding whether to adopt some form of comparative 
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litigation.234 But unwillingness to consider alternatives for which there is ample 
common law experience and that are not likely to generate confusion and 
litigation simply deprives the courts of the ability to mitigate the effect of the 
more serious misallocations that may occur when they create new substantive 
rights or decide to cut back on old ones. The United States Supreme Court, 
however, has exhibited no such reluctance to adjust remedies and even features 
of the trial process itself when to do so seems the best way to optimize important 
constitutional policies while preserving basic common law rights. Thus, for 
example, in order to make the law of defamation conform to the requirements 
of the first amendment, the Court has not just changed the substantive require-
ments for recovery but has adjusted the burden of proof and the rules of 
damages.235 The Supreme Court's creativity stands as a model for state supreme 
courts when they feel the need to change the law to achieve objectives they 
deem important.236 . 
Thus the change recommended in this article seems appropriate and ripe for 
judicial decision making. 237 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Whether and in what form the present negligence/strict liability/insurance 
system for dealing with personal-injury claims will survive the twentieth century 
negligence could not argue convincingly that it had arrived at the one "right" answer suggested by 
the,grecedents. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §1.5, at 25 (1974). 
. In this regard the Florida experience is instructive. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 S.2d 431 (Fla. 
Sup. Ct. 1973) (judicially creating pure comparative negligence and requiring principles of set-off 
to apply to awards of injured parties held liable to each other) with Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. 
Bournazian, 342 So. 2d 471 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1977) (set-off not to apply to extent injured parties are 
covered by liability insurance). See generally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974). 
235 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U. S. 254 (1964). 
231; The Supreme Court of Hawaii has demonstrated a willingness to adjust the burden of proof 
in order to serve important policy objectives. Medeiros v. Kondo, 55 Haw. 499, 522 P.2d 1269 
(1974) (plaintiff must adduce "clear and convincing proof" of malice to recover against a public 
official charged with harassing a civil service employee into relinquishing his position). 
It has been suggested that the burden of proof in cases of negligent infliction of mental distress 
should be increased by requiring plaintiff to prove his case by "more than a mere 'preponderance 
of the evidence.'" Koshiba, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: Rodrigues v. State and Leong v. 
Takasaki, II HAW. BJ. 29, 31 (1974). A more demanding burden of proof might provide greater 
protection against fraudulent claims and might also tend to reduce both the number of recoveries 
and the amounts awarded in settlement of doubtful cases. 
23; While the amendment to the wrongful death statutes suggested in the last section calls for 
legislative action, even here it may not be beyond the bounds of judicial competence to adjust the 
remedy without legislative action. Since recovery for negligently produced mental distress, in the 
absence of impact, was not permitted when most wrongful death statutes were passed, it is arguable 
that those statutes should not be interpreted to cover death produced by mental distress, absent 
impact, unless and until the legislature affirmatively acquiesces in the extension. See R. Keeton, 
Statutes, Gaps, and Values in Tort Law, 44 J. AIR L..& COM. I, (1978), where Professor Keeton 
discusses the appropriate approach to judicial interpretation of statutes that deal with or affect tort 
law. 
The effect of such interpretation in a state like Hawaii, if coupled with a judicial extension of 
the scope of liability in mental distress cases and limitation of damages in such cases to economic 
losses, likely would be to limit the estate of the deceased mental-distress victim to recovery of 
tangible economic losses in an action under the survival statute, HAW. REV. STAT. §663-7, 663-8 
(l976)-somewhat less generous than the solution suggested above. 
True, the survival statute was adopted before recovery for mental distress without impact was 
allowed. However, it may be argued that the statute was intended to be far more general in scope 
than the wrongful death act and that the legislature intended to permit broad categories of causes 
of actions, unless specifically excluded, to survive. See the illuminating discussion of the court's 
role in statutory interpretation in Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Haw. 150,433 P.2d 220 (1967). 
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is very much in doubt.238 Powerful interests, such as product manufacturers 
and distributors, the medical profession, and the insurance industry, have added 
their considerable clout, manifested in well-organized propaganda and lobbying 
campaigns, to the ever-increasing volume of well-reasoned theoretical attacks 
on the existing system and recommendations for change propounded by 
scholars of high reputation and unquestioned probity and sincerity.239 The 
public probably has great difficulty comprehending the more subtle aspects of 
the debate and is unusually susceptible because of inflationary conditions to 
real or imaginary "horribles" that purport to demonstrate how the existing 
system imposes excessively high transaction costs, increases insurance premiums 
and product costs, and, in the case of large judgments and settlements, ineffi-
ciently allocates scarce resources. The conditions that produced a "Proposition 
13,,240 could also produce the overthrow of the liability system. True, the trial 
bar has so far been successful in defeating the most comprehensive proposals, 
such as complete replacement of the tort system in automobile accident cases 
by no-fault, but the tide clearly seems to be running in favor of the reformers. 
The unspoken assumption of this article has been that, notwithstanding the 
need for improvement, the existing system of liability based upon negligence 
and strict responsibility for losses occasioned by defective products well serves 
important goals that would not be served in its absence. The system provides 
important incentives for safety in situations such as medical malpractice241 
where substitute incentives of even near-equal efficacy are not now available. 
Even in situations where the deterrence capability of the current system is 
questionable-as in the automobile accident context-242 the liability system, 
when it functions as it should, fills important gaps in compensation, thus 
reducing secondary accident costs that would otherwise have to be borne by 
individual accident victims.243 Furthermore, the system seems to establish 
behavior and performance standards for individuals and enterprises which, 
over time, are capable of being communicated to and internalized by the public 
at large.244 It is by no means clear what the effects would be if compensation 
for injuries and standards for liability were dissociated. The need that led to 
the adoption ofOSHA245-a full-blown scheme for regulating safety and health 
in the workplace-to operate in tandem with nonfault compensation for 
238 See R. Keeton, Statutes, Gaps, and Values in Tort Law, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. I, 2 (1978). 
Professor Keeton notes that proposals for legislative reforms of tort law have substantially increased 
since the decade of the sixties, that the activists seeking reform range across a wide spectrum of 
philosophies, and that the demand for reform is likely to continue to increase as we move toward 
the ~ear 2000. 
. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, No-FAULT AND BEYOND, Ch. V 
(1975). 
24<, CAL. CONST. art. XIII A (limiting maximum ad valorem tax on real property to one percent 
of "full cash value" of the property). 
241 See Chittenden, The Designated Compensable Event in Medical Malpractice 4 (Speech 
prepared for presentation to the A.B.A. National Institute Program in Minneapolis on June 5, 
1977) reprinted in A.B.A. NATIONAL INSTITUTE, THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM-Is IT TIME FOR 
CHANGE'? (1977); Torrey, Doctors Don't Police Own Ills: Unethical, Incompetent and Disabled 
PhYSicians Continue to Practice, Wash. Post, July 9, 1978,) § B (Outlook), at I; Halberstam, The 
Doctor's New Dilemma- Will I Be Sued?', N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1971, §6 (Magazine), at 8, 39. 
242 See Keeton, The Case/or No-Fault Insurance, 44 MISS. L.J. I, 12-13 (1973). 
243 See CALABRESI, supra note 103, at 45. 
244 "Rules may be said to affect behavior indirectly insofar as they help to reinforce the general 
moral climate in society which encourages people, unconsciously perhaps, to avoid socially 
destructive conduct." J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 85 n. 15 (1975). 
245 The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.c. §§651-78 (1970). 
46 UNIVERSITY OF HA WA1I LA W REVIEW Vol. I, No.1 
accidents under workers' compensation, however, does not inspire confidence 
that safety would be served by the separation.246 
If the current system is to survive, however, its rules will have to be adjusted 
to insure that the results it produces can be defended as comporting with 
community views of fairness and as serving important social goals with reason-
able efficiency.247 I have attempted to show with respect to the negligent 
infliction of mental distress (which is, of course, a paradigm of the larger 
problem facing the tort system) that it is possible, without affronting the rule of 
law, for the courts to make such adjustments. 
If courts are to respond with any degree of effectiveness to the challenges to 
the liability system they have fashioned, they must become more willing to 
engage in comprehensive policy analysis and to consider creative alternatives. 
The Hawaii Supreme Court in Rodrigues, like the California Supreme Court in 
Dillon, wrote a well-reasoned opinion that took current scientific understanding 
of the causes, effects, and manifestations of mental distress into account and 
focussed upon the victims' needs and equality of treatment. The opinion did 
not even come close to exceeding the limits of judicial propriety: The arbitrary 
limitations on liability imposed in other jurisdictions were seriously inconsistent 
with the requirements of justice, as demonstrated by the application of the 
"thin-skull" rule, in ordinary accident cases. Yet the opinion planted the seeds 
of its own destruction because it failed adequately to consider the effects of 
untrammeled liability for mental distress in cases where the potential for 
multiple recoveries could increase damages to shocking levels in relation to the 
conduct that produced them. When Kelley came along, the majority, now 
focussing primarily on the economic burden on defendants, responded in a 
predictable way by creating a new restriction nearly as arbitrary and unfair as 
the old ones. Unfortunately, since the court adopted a rule that on its face 
cannot be easily applied and also failed to articulate with reasonable clarity the 
considerations that are likely to govern its application, the effect was one of 
vacillation, unfairness, and uncertainty. 
If judicial decisionmaking is to retain its viability as an expositor and 
interpreter of policy in the face of the present-day cynical attitude toward 
power, questioning of the courts, and demands for candor from public officials, 
the innovative prescriptions of appellate courts in cases like Dillon, Rodrigues, 
and Kelley, which "count for the future,,,248 should be accompanied by as 
sophisticated and imaginative a consideration of policy goals, relevant societal 
conditions, decisional trends, likely outcomes, wider effects, and alternative 
approaches as judicial ingenuity and resources will permit.249 
246 Cf Miller, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the Law of Torts, 1974 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROB. 612, 613: "The principal significance of the utilization by Congress of such a 
punitive system of deterrence [as OSHA) is that it constitutes another compelling piece of evidence 
of widespread recognition by policy-makers that systems which were designed to provide compen-
sation or individual justice for accident victims have not provided adequate deterrence against 
accidents." 
247 See generally, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LEGISLATION, AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION, AUTOMOBILE No-FAULT INSURANCE (1978). 
2"" B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 165 (1921). 
249 See McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, I GEO. L. REV. 1,9, 19 (1966). Cf Keeton, 
Statutes, Gaps, and Values in Tort Law, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 1,20 (1978): "When courts are engaged 
in the inevitable enterprise of filling gaps in statutes, the value choices they make as legitimate 
representatives of society will be wiser as they are better informed by advocacy addressed explicitly 
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What this article has tried to demonstrate is how, with respect to the scope 
of liability for negligently inflicted mental distress, a problem that has long 
defied sensible resolution by the courts, such analysis can yield a solution that 
has the potential for maximizing the achievement of conflicting policy goals 
while avoiding recurrent appeals to the court for clarification. The specific 
solution suggested here-allowing recovery for mental distress to extend to 
foreseeable victims of serious distress but limiting their damages in most cases 
to their tangible economic losses-seems to serve considerations of justice, 
policy, and the rule of law considerably better than retreating, step by step, 
back toward the arbitrary "zone of danger" rule. 
to the competing principles, policies, and values at stake and as they are openly explained in judicial 
opinions." (Emphasis added.) Prof. Keeton suggests that the same approach should be taken in any 
case in which the courts "are engaged in value-laden choices," not just when statutes are being 
interpreted. [d. at 19. Also cf Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 
463, 497 (1962) (discussing the characteristics of a decision which can be examined to determine 
the "serviceability" of a doctrinal formulation set forth in the decision). 
